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FROM THE EDITORS
We are particularly pleased to be able to reproduce in this issue, 
by permission of Johns Hopkins Press, a classic from our past. 
Almost thirty years ago now, in 1982, Stephen Toulmin wrote a 
prescient article titled “How Medicine Saved the Life of Ethics.” 
Co-author with Al Jonsen of The Abuse of Casuistry, another 
classic contribution to the philosophy of medicine, Toulmin 
died in 2009. Tell me, dear readers—did medicine save the 
life of ethics?
As the doughty APA National Office continues to improve 
their already excellent support, our Newsletter is delighted to 
be able to offer our faithful readers an unusual treat—illustrated 
articles. Four presentations from the Committee-sponsored 
symposium on Health and Beauty, presented at Eastern Division 
as well as at the joint-sponsored session at October ASBH, are 
included in this issue. Leslie Francis’ comment on Lawrence 
Becker’s work on habilitation was inadvertently excluded from 
the last issue and is included here; and Ben Rich discusses 
important theoretical work on suffering and palliative care. A 
book review and a poem round out the issue.
We welcome your contributions and suggestions.
Mary Rorty and Mark Sheldon
ARTICLES
From the Crooked Timber of Humanity, 
Something Beautiful Should Be Made!1
Anita Silvers
San Francisco State University
I. Introduction
 Isaiah Berlin takes from a line in Kant’s Idea for a Universal 
History with a Cosmopolitan Aim (1784), “Out of the crooked 
timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made” (this is 
Berlin’s own translation) to characterize a major theme of 
his 1990 book of essays, The Crooked Timber of Humanity. 
In deploying the “crooked timber” locution, Berlin signals 
his anti-perfectionist approach to standards of political and 
practical value.
My thinking shares this same spirit. The approach to the 
standards of medical value I shall propose is anti-perfectionist, 
albeit perhaps in an unusual way, for I shall be pointing out how 
humans whose bodies literally are crooked are experienced 
as beautiful. As well, I shall argue that medical professionals 
have at least a mild duty to cultivate such aesthetic judgment. 
By contributing a crucial experiential component that enables 
aesthetic appreciation of biologically anomalous individuals, 
medical professionals have both the opportunity and the 
obligation to advance inclusive justice for them.
II. Bioethics and Beauty
This essay is about the connection between medicine and 
beauty. The topic is not much explored in bioethics research, 
or in philosophical aesthetics, or for that matter anywhere else. 
So here I begin by accounting for why bioethicists have given 
so little thought to the role the value of beauty should play in 
the ethical exercise of medical knowledge and skills.
The absence of discussion about this topic is somewhat of 
a puzzle, for there was a time several decades ago—in the era 
when bioethics as a discipline was undergoing rapid growth 
but had not yet been subject to its current professionalization—
when it was not unusual for scholars who previously wrote 
mainly about philosophical aesthetics to be drawn into the study 
of bioethics. I count myself as a comparatively latecomer from 
aesthetics to bioethics, having begun to think about moral and 
political issues in medicine beginning only in the 1990s. By the 
time I did so, bioethics scholarship already had been shaped by 
appallingly superficial and false presumptions about the lives 
of people with disabilities, embraced absent an evidentiary 
basis and lacking reflection by prominent influencers of the 
field. In sum, bioethicists typically gave no direct regard to 
people with disabilities, dismissing their lives as instances in 
which medical treatment had only partially succeeded or had 
completely failed.
Over the years, these biased misconceptions have 
changed, becoming somewhat camouflaged in some aspects 
but in others smoothed away. The publication in June 2011 of 
the World Report on Disability, a joint project of the World Health 
Organization and the World Bank, is designed to further the 
implementation of the 2006 U.N. Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities. The World Report recommends both 
conceptual and organizational changes in the understanding 
of medicine and in the delivery of medical services needed to 
enable the one billion members of the world’s population who 
live with disabilities to flourish.2 People with disabilities are more 
than three times more likely than nondisabled people to report 
being denied needed health care.3 The document recognizes 
disability bias that has infected the health care delivery system. 
Bioethics scholarship has been more likely to reflect than to 
remedy this problem.
Focusing on beauty initially may appear to be an odd 
strategy for reversing the devaluation of living with disability that 
characterized bioethics two decades ago and that, regardless of 
the direction global health policy now may be beginning to take, 
has yet to be extirpated from today.4 Seeking beauty may seem 
to be an aim with a strong affinity for perfectionism. Americans 
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sometimes are criticized for being so addicted to beauty that 
millions of dollars are wasted and millions of spirits are crushed 
as people strive in vain to look beautiful. Disability activists and 
scholars have been especially vigorous in condemning the 
valorizing of beauty. Seekers of beauty, they complain, distance 
whoever is not beautiful and people with disabilities are not 
beautiful. Except for segregated competitions such as the Ms. 
Wheelchair Contests, or for short-lived t.v. or magazine stunts, 
the disabled are not found among the images of beautiful people 
that appear on glossy magazine covers or appear on the many 
sizes of screens that command our attention every day.
Seeking beauty thus may appear unjustly exclusionary. 
Whoever falls too far short of achieving beauty will not merely 
be denied equal opportunity and social participation. Individuals 
whose beauty deficits are pronounced at best are relegated 
to social invisibility. In ordinary encounters with other people, 
seriously beauty-deficient individuals find it hard to make 
human connections because others turn their heads and look 
away. It is understandable that, from this perspective, beauty 
appears to be an enemy of justice.
To the contrary, I contend that the relationship between 
seeking beauty and engendering justice is quite a different 
one. The condemnations sketched above should instead be 
leveled at practices that hi-jack beauty and then transmogrify 
this value into something else. These familiar disability critiques 
of people’s efforts to enhance their beauty do not have to do 
with why we value beauty. They miss the mark because the 
interventions they target for criticism are aimed at various kinds 
of external functionality, and not at experiences of beauty.
Bioethicists often criticize using medical knowledge in the 
pursuit of beauty. I shall point out that bioethics community and 
disability community complaints about valuing beauty rest on 
the same mistake. As with disability critiques, in weighing the 
propriety of invoking beauty as a value in medicine, bioethics 
conversations have tended to conflate aesthetic with other 
values, and the benefits and costs of seeking beauty with other 
pursuits.
There is propriety in weighing these other concerns and 
pursuits—especially those that detract from inclusive justice—in 
bioethics. But while beauty may be good, the beautiful is not 
the good. Therefore, at least two distinct issues need to be 
addressed. One is, What is medicine’s capacity to bringing 
about beauty? The second is, In regard to this power, is 
medicine’s exercising it good?
As to the first question, familiar critiques of medical efforts 
to enhance beauty do not have to do with the intrinsic value of 
beauty, but instead with the instrumental value of functionality, 
which is something else. Beautiful things, as Kant understood, 
possess a character of being purposive, but things are not 
experienced as beautiful in virtue of their actual functionality. In 
his Third Critique (Critique of Judgment, 1790), Kant analyzed 
judgments of beauty as being about objects that are appreciated 
for appearing purposive but without identified purpose. Inspired 
by a Kantian analysis of beauty, I shall propose a heretofore 
underrated role for medicine in regard to the creation of 
experienced beauty, which involves medical professionals 
exercising a capability for promoting inclusive justice.
III. Confusion with Nonaesthetic Concerns
The two instrumental values with which beauty so often is 
confused by bioethicists are attractiveness and normality. I shall 
address each of these briefly to indicate the circumstances in 
which each can be a worthy objective of medical intervention 
and suggest as well the conditions under which they are not. 
Having addressed critiques that are not about beauty but regard 
these two other things, I then shall proceed to suggest, albeit 
briefly, an appropriate but neglected way in which medical 
knowledge and skill should promote beauty.
III.a. Attractiveness Is Not Beauty
The English word “cosmetic” comes from the Greek word 
for “adorn,” which accounts for why calling something 
“cosmetic” means rearranging it superficially so as to look 
more desirable or more impressive, whether or not it really 
is so. There is, consequently, a moral bias against deploying 
medical techniques for merely cosmetic outcomes. Given the 
root understanding of “cosmetic,” improving appearance can 
be rejected as an unworthy distortion of reality, hiding what 
a person’s nature really is. But this seems to me an otiose 
objection that disregards the function that attractiveness often 
plays.
Let me illustrate why I am reluctant to dismiss the 
worthiness of improving patients’ appearances. As the 
sociologist Kathy Davis points out, the initial large patient pool 
for surgical facelifts consisted of women who found themselves 
having to provide for their families after they reached middle 
age.5 That the stamp of maturity marked their brows, so to 
speak, when they sought entry-level positions in the job market 
proved dysfunctional given their economic status. Hence a 
practice of post-divorce cosmetic surgery grew.
I am suspicious of attempts to impose moral or political 
prohibitions against applying medical skills that will enable 
patients to gain functionality, even if social rather than biological 
function is the goal (and, parenthetically, even if functioning is 
enhanced rather than merely restored). In cases like those in 
Davis’s examples, the patient is not seeking to acquire privileged 
status through superior social functionality, but simply to attain 
equal social opportunity in a cultural context where unfair 
biases reign. Nevertheless, some might reject using medical 
knowledge and skills to acquiesce to age bias this way. Some 
might even condemn as complicit in age bias those surgical 
interventions that enable patients’ social functionality by 
making their faces more attractive. I reject that view because 
it is egregious to require the potential victims of social injustice 
to bear the brunt of fighting it.
Adopting this perspective also can resolve qualms about 
face transplants, surgery for children with facial anomalies, 
and so on. Face transplants are very challenging procedures 
and as such are not a plausible route for achieving superficial 
attractiveness alone. Such interventions are justifiable if (but 
only if) the probability of meaningfully improving social and/or 
biological functionality generously exceeds the probability of 
leaving the patient more dysfunctional than before. Improving 
functionality will be meaningful more or less to the degree the 
individual’s current appearance is socially dysfunctional.
The emphasis here should be on pursuing intervention only 
if the margin for success is reasonably wide. That is because 
the probability of harm in reducing already compromised 
functioning even further should be a much weightier 
consideration than equally probable benefit. To create such a 
harm is to deteriorate further the patient’s currently adapted 
life, a devolution surely more damaging than merely foregoing 
the opportunity for positive change. This perspective on how 
to weigh benefit against risk for patients whose functionality 
already is compromised has not been given sufficiently 
prominent recognition in bioethics. The advised approach is 
not revolutionary. This recommendation simply ratchets up 
some current cautionary considerations.
The reality of biases that render individuals with anomalous 
physiognomies socially dysfunctional creates a political 
obligation to permit and even pay for services that enable 
them to realize equality of opportunity. That obligation might 
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be discharged by effectively banning any expression of the 
bias, but, absent the political will to alter the conduct of all 
citizens alike, deploying the means for those who suffer from 
bias to have themselves altered so as to escape or reduce 
being targeted by others’ biased conduct is justifiable. Thus, 
face transplants are shown to be justifiable (within constraints 
regarding the potential for improving physical and social 
functionality) despite their expense and the usual burdens of 
maintaining transplanted tissues against rejection, by invoking 
the experiences reported by the procedure’s pioneer patients. 
In addition to demonstrable improvement in breathing, eating, 
speaking, sensation, and other physiological functions, which 
usually are the main benefits of this kind of profound facial 
reconstruction, face transplant patients report a noticeable 
reduction of encounters in which the people they meet turn 
their eyes away.
III.b. Normality Is Not Beauty
This brings us to the second value bioethicists sometimes 
confuse with beauty, namely, normality. Normality is a 
preeminent value in medicine but it should not be. Normality, in 
its familiar manifestation or interpretation as species typicality, 
usually but mistakenly is identified with optimal functionality. 
But functionality is conditional on a variety of both physiological 
factors which differ from individual to individual and social 
factors which are historically and culturally relative.
The array of biological capacities that make an individual 
typically, or even exceptionally, functional in some settings 
can compromise functionality in others. One of the standard 
illustrations of biological functionality conditional on context 
is sickle trait, which confers functionality on individuals in 
malarial swamps but not so much when an individual moves 
to a high altitude mountain site, and which seems benign (or 
more benign) for sedentary but not so much for energetic 
individuals.6 To give another example, extreme corpulence is 
socially functional for Tongans (corpulence is a mark of high 
social rank—the late King of Tonga was 444 pounds when he 
died at age 88 in 20067) but is dysfunctional for non-Tongans 
who must buy two seats on a plane or otherwise need to find 
transportation outside of Tonga.
The history of children with congenital phocomelia is 
a prototype of this misplaced faith that functionality follows 
from the approximation of normality.8 From infanthood, they 
used the hands and feet sprouting from shoulders and pelvis 
in unusual but functionally effective ways. But physicians and 
parents could not understand how the children could achieve 
manipulation or mobility except in the species typical way. 
Consequently prosthetic arms and legs of normal length were 
built for them, and their hands and feet were amputated to allow 
the prostheses to fit. The unfortunate result was a diminution of 
the children’s functionality, for the dexterity and motion offered 
by the prosthetics fell far short of what they had been able to 
accomplish with their  foreshortened fleshly hands and feet.
While the political issues arising from the often decried 
hegemony of the attractive and tyranny of the normal are 
serious, I believe them to be subject to rather straightforward 
resolutions about individual patients’ opportunities for benefit 
measured against risk. Their main danger lies in the tendency 
to exaggerate the benefits of being normal and understating 
the risks of the proposed means to becoming so. Too often the 
prospect of reducing the individual’s residual anomalous but 
effective functionality pales too rapidly against the dazzling but 
empty promise of normal functioning. Bioethical resolutions 
of such cases should be reasonably straightforward as long as 
what is at issue is posed accurately and clearly, not conflated 
with other questions, and not appropriated as stalking horses for 
much larger battles—such as those whether rationing schemes 
should permit medicine to make cosmetic interventions—in 
which enhancing beauty is peripheral rather than central to 
the strife.
IV. What Beauty Is
Having said what beauty is not, we can now turn to consider 
what beauty is. As background, I begin by offering an 
enormously compressed discussion of a theoretical framework 
drawn from the philosophical field of aesthetics.  Traditionally 
philosophical aesthetics has been concerned with such issues 
as where the property of beauty lies—and consequently what 
its nature, objective or subjective, is. Accounts of why people 
make judgments of beauty take aesthetic experience either (a) 
to serve some other value, usually by enhancing individuals’ 
moral sensibilities or cognitive skills, or (b) to be intrinsically 
or categorically valuable, that is, valuable in itself.
Recently evolutionary psychologists have brought these 
two notions about aesthetic value together in the following way. 
They propose that the affective dimensions of experiences of 
beauty are vestiges of adaptive processing of environmental 
stimuli. Aesthetic preferences are responses to experienced 
objects that stimulate the adaptive exercise of our perceptual 
and cognitive capacities. Philosophers of art will recognize the 
affinity of this biological account with Kant’s analysis of the 
judgment of beauty as expressing pleasure attendant on the free 
play of the decider’s imagination with her understanding.
Both eighteenth and twenty-first century thinkers suppose 
that aesthetic experience facilitates our human ability to 
construct a sophisticated and fecund fit between the world and 
our abilities to know what may be in the world.9 To experience 
aesthetically is to apprehend structure in apparent discord, 
unruliness, or disarray. Symmetry thus is loosely associated 
with beauty, but aesthetic valuation demands that, to be 
beautiful, perceived orderliness must be somewhat hard won 
and therefore must be something more than bland or banal 
regularity. For aesthetic experience, it is the achievement of 
coherence—the perception of the fitting or working together 
despite complexity or other challenges of the regarded object’s 
parts—that commands admiration.
We seek out innovative works of art for the pleasure of 
such experiences of discerning complex orderliness, but I 
contend that we can enjoy such aesthetic experience in our 
encounters with biologically anomalous people as well. This 
insight initially arose in an encounter I had more than a quarter 
century ago, and about which I have written intermittently since. 
It originated from my first close encounters with individuals with 
Osteogenesis Imperfecta Type III.10 For a week after I met them, 
I kept thinking they had a familiar look. And then I realized how 
I had seen them. Here’s how I described that revelation at the 
beginning of my 2000 essay11:
My friend sits before me. On the wall behind her the 
reproduction of a Picasso painting hangs. Although 
seen daily, the painting remains riveting to me. My 
gaze returns repeatedly to follow the contours of the 
pictured face, a flesh-colored triangle dominated 
by one tremendous egg-like eye, an unceasingly 
fascinating visual site.
My friend was born with a type of dwarfism: in 
addition to lower limbs too short for walking, she 
has the physiognomy characteristic of this condition. 
In appearance startlingly similar to the one in the 
painting, my friend’s face is a fleshly broad-foreheaded 
triangle, flattened so that it seems much like a picture 
plane, dominated by enormous doe-eyes When her 
face is in profile, one eye appears to occupy almost 
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the whole upper half of her head, very much like the 
immense eye in the profiled painted face.
Knowing how to look at cubist paintings apprised me about 
how to appreciate the look of my friend. But simply knowing 
how to appreciate her look did not suffice to engender 
the special pleasure 
that is the experience 
of beauty. One other 
part of the experiential 
formula was to learn 
about OI, and especially 
OI Type III. The interplay 
between entertaining 
conceptualizations that 
apply to ordinary (what 
I sometimes call “plain 
vanilla”) human biology 
and envisaging the riffs 
that human biology 
plays in the atypical but 
effective functioning 
of people with OI III 
stimulated a gratifying 
interplay of understanding and imagination, very much along 
the lines of the Kantian account of aesthetic appreciation. 
Discovering that individuals with such prodigious biological 
differences can function so effectually is both compelling and 
pleasurable.
V. Advancing Inclusive Justice
Medicine does not usually deal with biological anomaly 
aesthetically. But, I propose, those who have the requisite 
a c c e s s  t o  m e d i c a l 
knowledge have at least 
a mild obligation as a 
duty of inclusive justice 
to do so. Although not 
commonly deployed for 
this purpose, medical 
knowledge can promote 
positive appreciation 
o f  ind iv idua l s  w i th 
biological differences 
who otherwise might be 
perceived as defective—
whether the anomalies 
picked out (or on) be 
attributed to race or sex 
or disability or something 
else—as beautiful.
Coming one’s self to 
appreciate the functional 
virtuosities of biologically atypical people rather than assessing 
their differences as defective, and guiding others in doing so, is 
an important and satisfying occupation. Regarding humans who 
are different, the physician or medical researcher can play a role 
similar to that executed by art historians in regard to art works 
that are different. The art historian is not the art critic. The art 
historian accounts for why some crafted objects deviate from 
more common or familiar ones, but does not demean them 
because of their divergences. Nor should the expert in biological 
processes devalue people because of differences in biological 
functioning. Art historians enable audiences to understand 
uncommon art and, by appreciating their innovation, to regard 
as beautiful objects that otherwise would be rejected as too 
disturbing. So can the medical professional enable similar 
appreciation of biologically uncommon people.
Kant’s observation that from the crooked timber of humanity 
no straight thing was ever made can be taken positively as 
pointing appreciatively to the enormous variation among 
members our successful species displays. My emendation is 
that from the crooked timber of humanity much more that is 
beautiful can and should be made. By enabling humans with 
different biologies to appreciate each other—even to see each 
other as beautiful—medical professionals can promote their 
positively interacting with one another and by doing so can 
advance inclusive justice. That medical professionals should do 
so is a case bioethicists have not—but should have—made.
Postscript: On the day after I submitted a revised version of 
this essay, the New York Times ran a story about high school 
students who were shown photos of young people with visible 
genetic disorders and told not to look away. The photographer 
said of the pictures he made, “The idea was to bring these 
gorgeous kids into a community that didn’t know them and 
create a more inclusive society. It’s our responsibility to steady 
our gaze to see beauty, and not to look away…” And in their 
high school philosophy class, students searched for insights in 
the aesthetic theories of Hume, Kant, and Nietzsche.12
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Beauty as Pride: A Function of Agency
Peg Brand
IUPUI
As clichés go, there’s none better than “Beauty is in the eye of 
the beholder.”
Often this phrase is invoked to reconcile differing value 
judgments between pet owners, fashion designers, or family 
members who simply cannot fathom what you see of aesthetic 
value in another person whose looks fail to impress. But 
among aestheticians and lovers of art, this phrase can provide 
a plausible reason, a convincing rationale, or a failsafe escape 
from artistic disagreement. Locating the source of one’s 
judgment of beauty in the eye of the beholder allows the 
viewer to be the subjective decider. Never mind that the artist 
has intentionally crafted a visual spectacle that embodies or 
expresses objective properties of beauty; let the decision rest 
with the viewer.
When the representation open to judgment is the human 
body—naked or nude (the distinction made emphatically by 
Kenneth Clark in 1956 in his classic book The Nude: A Study 
in Ideal Form)—then interpretation and evaluation become 
more complicated. No longer are we merely following the 
five-part formula of eighteenth-century British empiricists like 
Edmund Burke, Francis Hutcheson, and David Hume who 
characterized the supposedly “disinterested” experience of 
beauty as consisting of:
1. Perception
2. Triggered faculty of taste
3. Object with particular properties (of beauty)
4. Resulting in pleasure
5. Yields a pronouncement of “this is beautiful.”
Rather, we are in the realm of contextual analysis: looking at the 
simple fact that many of the most famous nude bodies depicted 
throughout the history of art are those of women, created by 
men, as objects of beauty for us to freely gaze upon: perhaps 
disinterestedly, and perhaps not.1
This presentation will explore and engage the newest mode 
of defiant challenges to that ideal standard of beauty portrayed 
throughout the history of art—the female form—as expressed 
by artist Joel-Peter Witkin in a series of provocative photographs 
from the past ten years. I will narrow the scope considerably, 
to only a few artworks, because they are so complex: choosing 
to focus on three images (plus one of a male nude) that 
involve bodies with disabilities posing, i.e., performing for the 
camera, the photographer, 
and the viewing audience. 
This is basically a paper 
about artistic evaluation and 
how multiple interpretations 
can give rise to inconsistent 
and conflicting meanings. 
Images like Witkin’s First 
Casting for Milo  (2004) 
challenge the viewer to 
look closely, understand 
the formal properties at 
work, and then extract a 
meaning that ultimately asks, 
Is the model exploited or 
empowered? Is Karen Duffy, 
pictured here, vulnerable 
and “enfreaked” or is she 
potent ia l ly  subvers ive, 
transgressive, and perhaps 
self-empowered?
I will offer an argument in agreement with artist/author/
performer Ann Millett-Gallant that favors the latter interpretation, 
but will augment and complicate the issue by also introducing a 
pointed question or two taken from a recent analysis by Cynthia 
Freeland on objectification. I judge the works by photographer 
Joel-Peter Witkin to be representations of disabled persons 
who are empowered through agency and pride, but I also 
worry about the risk of multiple, conflicting interpretations 
on the part of viewers who do not, or cannot, entertain such 
enlightened readings. Like second wave feminist views about 
pornography that depicted women in demeaning ways, or 
feminist critiques of Judy Chicago’s The Dinner Party, Witkin’s 
photos can be judged as potentially offensive. But they are 
also objects of beauty—both in terms of aesthetic properties 
(they are magnificent studies in black and white, shadows, the 
human body, with many classical references) and because of 
the feeling of beauty and pride felt by the posers, who become 
performers of their own beauty and pride. I argue that beauty 
trumps offensiveness. Pride wins. But I’m not sure that everyone 
will agree.
I. Disarming Venus
“Disarming Venus” is not my term but rather the creative 
phrase offered by author Ann Millett-Gallant in her recent 
book, The Disabled Body in Contemporary Art.2 It is the title 
of the first chapter in which she seeks to educate viewers in 
how to “visualize disability” in opposition to canonical erasure 
or more recent trends of casting such bodies in freak shows 
and displays of “otherness.” She cites images by painter Frida 
Kahlo as historical precedents of a woman picturing her own 
body (starting in the 1930s in Mexico) as “broken, wounded, 
and degenerate due to her disabilities.”3 She focuses on self-
portraits that display Kahlo’s “personal and medical body” in 
images of “her numerous miscarriages, surgeries, recoveries, 
and physical degeneration.”
The “self” portrayed in Kahlo’s work emerges as a 
body in pieces—graphically ripped apart, wounded, 
bleeding, and impaled. …Kahlo was ahead of her time 
in her unashamed, graphic, and performative bodily 
displays of disability.4
She cites feminist admirers and the overall popularity of Kahlo—
both as artist and Mexican role model—as she emphatically 
points to the transgressive nature of her performance:
This performance contradicts conventional narratives 
of pity, deficiency, and isolation that characteristically 
1
Beauty as Pride: A Function of Agency
Eastern APA (December 29, 2010)
Peg Brand (IUPUI)
Joel-Peter Witkin. First Casting for Milo (2004). Catherine Edelman Gallery, Chicago.
As clichés go, there’s none better than “Beauty is in the eye of the beholder.” 
Oft n this phrase is invoked to reconcile differing value judgments between pet owners, 
fashion designers, or family members who simply cannot fathom what you see of aesthetic value 
in another person whose looks fail to impress. But among aestheticians and lovers of art, this 
phrase can pr vide a plausible reason, a c nvincing ration l , or a failsafe escape from artistic 
disagreement. Locating the source of one’s judgment of beauty in the eye of the beholder allows 
the viewer to be the subjective decider. Never mind that the artist has intentionally crafted a 
visual spectacle that embodies or expresses objective properties of beauty; let the decision rest 
with the viewer. 
When the representation open to judgme t is th  h man body – naked or nude (the 
distinction made emphatically by Kenneth Clark in 1956 in his classic book The Nude: A Study 
Joel-Peter Witkin, First Casting for 
Milo (2004). Catherine Edelman 
Gallery, Chicago.
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surround disabled women…[she] is portrayed as 
passionate and sensual, rather than corporeally and 
sensorially “lacking” and helplessly dependent.5
Perhaps even more importantly for this session, being sponsored 
by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Medicine, her 
body—boldly on display as a “spectacle” (her preferred term—
serves “as a site, target, and vehicle for ideology and creative 
express ion” within 
disability studies “to 
overturn predominant 
s t e r e o t y p e s  a b o u t 
bodies and norms for 
social acceptability” 
based  on  medica l 
m o d e l s  t h a t  v i e w 
disability as “a set of 
medical and corporeal 
‘problems’” to be cured, 
fixed, or eliminated.6 
The posing of her self 
elevates Kahlo to a 
level of agency and 
activism; she becomes a 
proponent of visualizing 
the disabled that results 
in  the  subvers i ve , 
t r a n s g r e s s i v e 
overturning of traditional 
w e s t e r n  i d e a l s  o f 
feminine beauty (such as those  embodied in the classical 
Venus de Milo) and an example of a new and different sort of 
beauty, namely, one that exudes a concept promoted by the 
Disability Arts and Culture movement and involves what is 
known as disability pride.
This is the thesis of her entire book, as she works through 
numerous examples and argues that disability as socially 
constructed by our culture as abnormal, lacking, other, and 
freak, is wrong. She seeks to correct the readings of visual 
disability through her (admittedly) subjective interpretations of 
bodies on display by contextualizing them within an interpretive 
framework that sees and identifies with the poser/performer 
who chooses to exhibit her disability rather than hide or deny 
it. These posers choose to flaunt their bodily differences in 
resistance to mainstream culture
that teaches disabled people that our success is 
intrinsically tied to the denial of our disabilities and 
our bodies. If we are successful (“able”), we must 
“overcome” our disability—effectively defeat our 
impairments—and become as normal as possible, 
for, we are told, this is the goal.7
This form of self-exhibition is counterintuitive, alarming, 
and even shocking to some viewers. Photographer and disability 
studies theorist David Hevey has suggested that “photography 
‘enfreaks’ disabled people, thus socially and visually constructing 
them as ostracized ‘others’.”8 This is the risk that all visual (and 
perhaps literary) representations run when interpreted by an 
audience who is unlearned in the interpretive framework 
advanced by Millett-Gallant. The question becomes, Is it worth 
the risk of misinterpretation to visually represent disability, 
particularly when the poser feels empowered, beautiful, and 
proud? The same question was once asked about women 
posing in porn designed for the male gaze, as if feminists knew 
better than porn-posers what was empowering and what was 
not. But more recent artworks by women have become more 
transgressive than ever, reproducing the conventions of porn 
while simultaneously parodying them. The lesson of learning 
how to look is a valuable one, if not still controversial.
II. Performance as a Freakish Venus
When Irish artist Karen Duffy posed for the Witkin photograph 
in 2004, she was engaged in a silent performance of disarming 
Venus. Born without arms, Duffy has performed in live artworks 
since 1995 when she posed in the nude, in a self-objectifying 
act where she verbally explained that her body was already 
objectified in society and she was taking control/ taking back 
her dignity—from cultural stereotypes that cast her body as 
shameful, unacceptable, and better left unseen. She becomes 
the anti-idealized body: excessive and taboo. Staged by Witkin 
in seductive lingerie and partially shrouding drapery, she 
also openly performs “as a freakish Venus” who “means to 
intrude upon and liberate herself from histories of oppressive 
representations of women and disabled women specifically.”9 
This is intended to be an exercise of agency by which one’s 
experience of disability becomes a tool toward artistic and 
feminist activism.
Moreover, she parades herself in defiance of a condemning 
medical gaze that has turned disabled bodies into “medical 
curiosities” within a purportedly sanitized, scientific, and 
objective realm. Citing early medical photography in the 
nineteenth to early twentieth century that became a widely 
popular form of entertainment, disabled bodies were displayed 
for paying customers to gawk over with voyeuristic pleasure. 
Millett-Gallant suggests that the photographer, Witkin (who 
studied such early photographs), appropriates the voyeuristic 
and theatrical medical gaze for the purpose of subverting its 
belittling power over such bodies that were forced to recoil 
under view. Humor and Fear, New Mexico is another work 
by Witkin that is cited as accomplishing similar goals. In this 
depiction, the author contends, the poser is “performing 
amputation”: a clear reference to medical vocabulary that 
focuses on the model’s impairments, her hands and particularly 
her right leg. Like 
photographer and 
disability studies 
theorist David Hevey 
h a s  s u g g e s t e d 
(that “photography 
‘enfreaks’ disabled 
p e o p l e ,  t h u s 
socially and visually 
constructing them as 
freakish, ostracized 
‘others’”),  crit ic 
Garland-Thomson 
m a i n t a i n s  t h a t 
fetishization of the 
body and particular 
body parts, derived 
f r o m  m e d i c a l 
models,  “serves 
t o  e c l i p s e  t h e 
multidimensional 
nature of disabled subjects, constructing disability as social 
spectacle.”10 In other words, multiple readings of the body are 
lost in favor of one objectifying, “enfreaking” process by which 
the viewer gazes/stares to see and to know “what happened” 
to cause the abnormality. Upon learning that the model lost 
her limb, as a young woman, due to toxic shock syndrome 
incurred from the use of a tampon, and thus amputated by 
medical procedures, Garland-Thomson’s reading of the body-
as-spectacle construes her in the “role of medical specimen, 
subjected to a diagnostic gaze/stare.”11 Millett-Gallant argues 
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The “self” portrayed in Kahlo’s work emerges as a body in pieces – graphically ripped 
apart, wounded, bleeding, and impaled. . . . Kahlo was ahead of her time in her 
unashamed, graphic, and performative bodily displays of disability.4
Frida Kahlo. Remembrance of an Open Wound (1938).
She cites feminist admirers and the overall popularity of Kahlo – both as artist and Mexican role 
model – as she emphatically points to the transgressive nature of her performance:
This performance contradicts conventional narratives of pity, deficiency, and isolation 
that characteristically surround disabled women . . . . [she] is portrayed as passionate and 
sensual, rather than corporeally and sensorially ‘lacking’ and helpl ssly dependent.5
Perhaps even more importantly for this session, being sponsored by the APA Committee on 
Philosophy and Medicine, her body – boldly on display as a ‘spectacle’ (her preferred term) –
serves “as a site, target, and vehicle for ideology and creative expression” within disability 
studies “to overturn predominant stereotypes about bodies and norms for social acceptability”  
based on medical models that view di ability as “a set of medic l and corporeal ‘pr blems’” to 
Frida Kahlo, Remembrance of an Open 
Wound (1938).
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Joel-Peter Witkin. Humor and Fear, New Mexico (1999)
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in response that the image “exceeds medical discourse in its 
blatant theatricality” and defies such a predictable, objectifying 
reading. But remember, beauty is in the eye of the beholder; 
with which reading are you more comfortable?
Perhaps, as we quibble over conflicting interpretations, 
it would be good to hear from the model who was reported 
to have said to Peter-Joel Witkin, upon viewing the finished 
photograph “with pride,” that it made her feel beautiful. This 
is Millett-Gallant’s strongest argument for her interpretation but 
it may not be decisive for some viewers who simply cannot 
read the image in that way. It is worth noting that one of my 
students, who weighs 83 pounds and is a force to be reckoned 
with when she enters the classroom in her wheelchair, giggled 
with glee when she saw this photograph and the previous 
one by Witkin. Having studied the works of Frida Kahlo, she 
felt vindicated by contemporary images of the disabled body 
in which she immediately saw (and felt, I presume) a similar 
sense of agency, pride, and beauty. She acted as if the artworld 
had finally caught up with the self-empowerment felt in the 
paintings by Kahlo that were seen as being ahead of their time, 
a harbinger of a more organized disability pride movement. She 
only read them in one way: positive. And she wanted to learn 
more about them.
III. Objectification or Subjectification of Performance/
Posing?
It is worth noting that Millett-Gallant realizes that her 
interpretations are disputable. She always frames the question 
of interpreted meaning in terms of the possibility of the images 
being transgressive. She leaves open the charge of exploitation, 
“enfreakment,” and invites dialogue. Allow me to offer one way 
of extending the discussion, namely, by means of an interesting 
analysis of portraiture offered by Cynthia Freeland, by way of 
Martha Nussbaum. First, consider a third example by Witken of 
a work that “performs amputation”: Portrait of Greg Vaughn.
Here the young, androgynous male body resembles the 
early Greek ideal kouros figure with idealized Classical features. 
But the overdone theatricality and humorous, playful props 
are absent. This young man poses in quite a vulnerable and 
expectant position. As Millett-Gallant observes,
this modern day kouros…is entirely nude (as the body 
is considered in art) and/or naked (as it is considered 
in medical imagery)…the photograph, like Humor 
and Fear, plays with visions of the body with and 
as ornamental objects…[it] not only represents but 
performs amputation, not as a surgical and disarming 
act of removing limbs, but rather as an embodied 
performance of identity…Witkin’s photographic 
performances of amputation dissect the inherent 
contradictions, supposed neutrality, and integrity of 
the medical gaze and medical imagery.12
But do they? Is this how you read this image, as opposed to the 
previous one? Or does the age of the poser and the vulnerability 
of his stance (with his arm leaning on the marble), jeopardize 
the preferred interpretation of an agentic, empowered, proud 
beauty?
A new book by Cynthia Freeland, entitled Portraits and 
Persons: A Philosophical Inquiry, offers an enlightening analysis 
of portraits in terms of personal identity as well as aesthetic 
qualities that focuses in one chapter on the topic of intimacy.13 
Basically, Freeland’s thesis is that portraits are a genre of fine 
art that express (1) physical individuality and recognizability, 
(2) an inner life/character/psychological or mental states of the 
sitter (poser), and (3) an awareness on the part of both the artist 
and subject that they are self-consciously engaged in a process 
of depication, thereby 
excluding most animal 
portraiture from the 
definition of the term. 
At one point Freeland 
suggests that the portrait 
subject must actually 
“look back” at the artist, 
allowing him/herself to 
be viewed, in order to be 
a full participant in the 
process of portraiture.14 
I raise this condition 
from Freeland as a 
way of complicating 
the meaning of  the 
per formance of the 
poser in Portrait of Greg 
Vaughan because, unlike 
the previous two photos 
(but like the paintings of 
Frida Kahlo), he looks 
out at the artist and 
viewer. Freeland cites 
Martha Nussbaum’s criteria for objectification as follows:
1. Person P uses person Q as an instrument (means);
2. P denies Q’s autonomy;
3. P treats Q as inert;
4. P treats Q as interchangeable or fungible;
5. P violates Q’s boundaries;
6. P treats Q as something that can be owned;
7. P denies Q’s subjectivity.15
She then constructs her own set of criteria, based 
in opposition to Nussbaum, that define what she calls 
“subjectification” that allows for the intimate depiction of a 
sitter in a non-objectified way:
1. Person P treats Q as an end and not a means; 
2. P endorses Q’s autonomy;
3. P treats Q as active and alive;
4. P treats Q as unique and irreplaceable; 
5. P respects Q’s boundaries;
6. P treats Q as something that cannot be owned;
7. P endorses Q’s subjectivity.16
It is easy to see how Freeland would interpret many so-called 
portraits of nude females in evidence throughout the canon of 
western European art history as objectified according to these 
criteria. But how do Witkin’s photos fare on her analysis?
Millett-Gallant’s informal criterion of agency seems to 
replicate conditions (2) - (3), and perhaps (6) - (7). But in looking 
at Portrait of Greg Vaughn, can we decisively say that Witkin 
treats Vaughn as an end and not a means (condition (1)) or 
as unique and irreplaceable (4)? (His uniqueness, indeed his 
humanity, seems threatened by his physical connection to the 
marble support, of which he appears to be a part.) In painting 
the model’s skin a pasty white to resemble the roughly hewn, 
unsculpted marble support, has Witkin respected Vaughn’s 
boundaries (5)? I believe these are difficult questions to answer 
and pose a challenge for Millett-Gallant who is willing to admit to 
competing interpretations of visual disability in art (and disability 
pride), but who repeatedly minimizes them. I do not have time 
to delve into it fully here, but Freeland is much more unsure 
about how to interpret problematic and controversial images; 
she cites, for example, the work of Robert Mapplethorpe 
and the examples that really push people over the edge, the 
9
Joel-Peter Witkin. Portrait of Greg Vaughn (2004). Catherine Edelman Gallery, Chicago.
Here the young, androgynous male body resembles the early Greek ideal kouros figure with 
idealized Classical features. But the overdone theatricality and humorous, playful props are 
absent. This young man poses in quite a vulnerable and expectant position. As Millett-Gallant 
observes, 
this m dern day k uro . . . is entirely ude ( s t body is considered in art) and/or 
naked (as it is considered in medical imagery). . . . the photograph, like Humor and Fear,
plays with visions of the body with and as ornamental objects. . . . [it] not only represents 
but performs amputation, not as a surgical and disarming act of removing limbs, but 
rather as an embodied performance of identity. . . . Witkin’s photographic performances 
of amputation dissect the inherent contradictions, supposed neutrality, and integrity of the 
medical gaze and medical imagery.12
Joel-Peter Witkin. Portrait of Greg 
Vaughn (2004). Catherine Edelman 
Gallery, Chicago.
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photographs of nude children posed by their mother in rural 
Virginia: photographer Sally Mann.
Is it enough for Mann’s daughter to report, later in life, 
that “we enjoyed being photographed. It gave us a sense of 
beauty”?17 The similarity, in some respects, of Witkin’s Portrait 
of Greg Vaughn and Mann’s Popsicle Drips, is instructive. It alerts 
us to the multiple meanings not only of visual representations of 
boyhood, young men’s bodies, and the depiction of disability, 
but also to the professed voice of the poser/performer whose 
pronouncements might more reasonably be taken with a grain 
of salt. As mentioned earlier, I offer the comparison of these 
photos as a way to extend the dialogue begun by Ann Millett-
Gallant, as it brings together two realms of inquiry—disability 
studies and feminist aesthetics—at the site of very complicated 
images. In re-reading Freeland’s analysis, I sense her difficulty 
and frustration at arriving at clean, decisive readings of the 
photographs of Sally Mann. Aware that subjective responses 
can vary greatly, Freeland argues that some of Mann’s photos 
fail the criteria of subjectification, and she relegates them to the 
realms of objectification instead. Her reaction to the comment 
made by Mann’s daughter, Jesse, in which she conveyed a sense 
of enjoyment and beauty, is none too subtle:
My response to this comment is the same as the 
point made earlier about little girl beauty queens. It 
is difficult to defend the position that their choices to 
participate in competitions that objectify and hyper-
sexualize them at a young age are autonomous. And 
so even if, like Jesse Mann, they comment later on 
that they enjoyed the process, their opinion does not 
cancel out the fact of their objectification. Sally Mann 
is like any other stage mom (or dad) using a child as 
means to an end.18
IV. Millett-Gallant’s Performing Amputation
In this final photo by Joel-Peter Witkin, Ann Millett-Gallant 
herself, the author of the text I have used primarily throughout 
this paper, is performing amputation. Entitled Retablo, New 
Mexico, she is the figure on the right with her back to us in an 
elaborately staged retablo which references Latin American, 
Catholic folk art traditions (and for Millett-Gallant, she notes, 
the works of Kahlo). Witkin was inspired by a retablo image 
of two lesbians embracing, posed above a prayer to San 
Sebastian, thanking him for bringing them together. Witkin’s 
photograph also contains this prayer (at the bottom) and 
is steeped in the European tradition of retablos such as the 
Italian painter Duccio’s painting of Christ resisting Lucifer’s 
temptations (although in Witkin’s, this includes a future of the 
world after the tragedy of 9/11). The principle female nude is 
modeled after Veronica, who gazes down at her lover, Sylvia, 
staged on a pedestal covered in flowing drapery, and includes a 
characteristic St. Sebastian and a skeleton reminiscent of death. 
Even Millett-Gallant summarily states, “I cannot logically explain 
the photograph, as it defies a central narrative. It is far more 
sensory than sensible,” but she is quick to proffer that she felt 
no embarrassment disrobing, removing her prosthesis, being 
painted white, and being posed.19 She concludes her book with 
this image, sharing her thoughts with us:
I have my back to the camera and am seated on my 
two shorted legs (one congenitally amputated above 
the knee and one below), as I extend my “deformed,” 
or here fabulist/fabulous arms. The female figures are 
opposing in the positions—one flaunting the front of 
her nude body, the other much smaller and flaunting 
her back. The two bodies complement one another 
and complete a disfigured, heavenly narrative. Witkin 
said he especially, aesthetically admired my back, 
which inspired the pose. This seated figure that is me 
is magical and all-powerful; as viewers stare at my 
back, I stare back. Like the other models in this book, I 
perform for my readers/viewers. Life becomes art.20
I  l e a v e  t h e  f i n a l 
analysis, interpretation, and 
evaluation up to you. Does 
performing amputation 
embody agency, pride, 
and beauty? Or is it an ill-
conceived exploitation 
of one’s vulnerability? I 
would suggest that there 
are multiple interpretations 
to ponder here and that 
perhaps the more we 
consider, the richer the 
discussion will be. I look 
forward to the discussion 
in the hopes that we can 
discern even more nuanced 
criteria for a concept of 
“disability pride” and the 
natural correlative of that 
concept, one which has so far remained unnamed: the concept 
of disability beauty.
Endnotes
1. My favorite Burke quote always seemed to reveal more desire 
than disinterest: “observe that part of a beautiful woman 
where she is perhaps the most beautiful, about the neck 
and breasts: the smoothness; the softness; the easy and 
invisible swell; the variety of the surface, which is never for the 
smallest space the same; the deceitful maze, through which 
the unsteady eye slides giddily, without knowing where to 
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Whether disabled or not, people who do not meet appearance 
norms often feel intense pressure to use available medical 
interventions to “fix” their appearance. Feminists have critiqued 
the practice of cosmetic surgery given its complicity with sexist 
norms of appearance and standards of beauty.1 In disability 
studies circles, the pressure to adhere to norms of species-
typical functioning has also been widely criticized.2 Should 
such criticisms extend to practices and medical interventions 
designed to help people achieve species-typical appearance 
norms? In this paper, I argue that they should, but with certain 
caveats. Namely, the criticism of species-typical functioning is 
not so much a problem with the attempt to help people achieve 
the norms as such, but rather the social, institutional, and 
contextual features that make that offer very difficult to resist, 
and that simultaneously denigrate the worth of the individual as 
she is without typical functioning. In a world in which disabled 
people were widely valued and respected for their abilities, 
some individuals might well prefer to use medical technologies 
or other interventions to attempt to achieve typical functioning. 
But not all would, and we could perhaps be more confident that 
what motivated individuals who did desire such change would 
not be a sense that they could not be complete or valued without 
it. Similarly, in the case of interventions to achieve normal 
appearance, what matters most, morally speaking, is not that 
an intervention aims at producing a particular look, but rather 
the relative ease of acceptance of the individual regardless of 
whether she gets the intervention, and the ways that social 
practices can constrain her alternatives.
In this paper, I focus on how pressures to achieve 
appearance norms align with similar and troubling pressures to 
meet functioning and beauty norms, and how such pressure can 
undermine or diminish individual autonomy. Put another way, 
I’m less interested in what the particular aimed-for appearance 
is, and more interested in what motivates a person to seek it. 
As a secondary point, though, I think we need to be aware of 
how social expectations shift in accordance with what many 
individuals do, even if each individual does so autonomously, 
and they do not aim for a collective end. When many people 
seek surgery to enhance their looks, they exacerbate pressures 
on others to meet similar standards.
Cosmetic surgery is a relatively widely accepted practice 
that still raises the hackles of many feminists. In philosophical 
debates over its moral acceptability, criticisms sometimes focus 
on how autonomous choices for cosmetic surgery really are. 
That is, although women certainly can be said to “choose” 
such surgery, and even sometimes adamantly insist that they 
are doing it for themselves (not for anyone else, or due to any 
troubling interference), critics have expressed concern about 
two possibilities: 1) that such women don’t have sufficient 
alternatives, at least with respect to maintaining their social 
status, given sexism in society; 2) that such women may have 
internalized oppression that undercuts the apparent authenticity 
of their choice. When people act within unduly constrained 
circumstances (“your money or your life” spoken at gunpoint is 
obvious coercion; “get a face lift or lose your broadcasting job” 
may similarly be coercive, even if it is not directly threatened 
but clearly understood), or when they accept norms that 
denigrate them, learning to see themselves as problematic or 
of lesser value than others, we need to pay close attention to 
how much weight we give their individual decisions in terms 
of their responsibility and our duty to respect their autonomy. 
Saying “she knew what she was getting into, and she chose it” 
seems troubling if a woman who gets cosmetic surgery deeply 
felt that she could not be acceptable or employable without 
it. It sets an overly narrow scope on the moral dimensions of 
the issue at hand. Instead, the widespread use of cosmetic 
surgery, particularly by women, means that we need to attend 
to the broader social forces—such as continuing oppression 
of women—that constrain women’s action and may undercut 
their senses of self.3 Sexism in norms of appearance hasn’t gone 
away, despite the efforts of third wave feminists to try to seize 
control of our ideas of beauty and appearance.
Our reasons for questioning the sexist norms of appearance 
underlying the use of cosmetic surgery may also be reasons 
for questioning the norms of appearance that motivate people 
with visible bodily abnormalities (e.g., facial “wine stains,” cleft 
palate, atypical limb growth, scars from burns or trauma) to seek 
to “correct” their appearance. That is, we should also be asking 
whether or not such individuals have sufficient alternatives 
to treatment (or do they feel unduly pressured to receive 
treatment?), and is their choice among alternatives possibly 
the result of internalized oppression? In what follows, I will 
explore how norms of appearance influence decisions about 
medical interventions for people with visible abnormalities. 
In particular, I want to examine a) whether those norms are 
morally troubling in ways similar to the norms of appearance 
that drive the cosmetic surgery industry; and b) how we might 
distinguish between internalized oppression and autonomous 
choice in accordance with mainstream values.
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Sexist norms of appearance/ableist norms: some 
commonalities
What, then, might we say about how norms of appearance 
influence or constrain the choices of disabled people, who 
face a multitude of normalizing pressures? Much work has 
been done in disability studies to critique the norm of species-
typical functioning, and the assumption that species-typical 
functioning is either a biological ideal or a normative one. 
Yet visibly impaired people (e.g., in wheelchairs, with limb 
anomalies, showing difficulties in muscular control) often 
face intense pressure to use available medical treatments 
and experimental therapies to attempt to bring their bodies 
back into common modes of functioning, and failing that, 
are left to deal with frustrating attitudes of pity, judgments of 
incompetence, and lowered expectations. Given that alternative 
modes of functioning are possible, and sometimes meet or 
exceed species-typical modes of functioning, these pressures 
are surely misplaced, and the negative consequences for failing 
to adhere to them are unnecessary. So, for example, why 
pressure someone to use crutches if she can get around more 
efficiently in a wheelchair? Though the crutches may appear to 
more closely approximate the species-typical mode of getting 
place to place—walking—if the wheelchair works quite well 
we should be open to it as an alternative mode of achieving 
the same general goal. So long as the built environment is 
designed to accommodate wheelchairs, this alternative mode 
of functioning may be superior for this individual.
While disability studies scholars have widely argued 
for a sociopolitical conception of disability that focuses 
on the unnecessary connection between impairment and 
oppression/discrimination, and have pointed to myriad ways in 
which available alternatives are artificially limited for disabled 
people in order to encourage them to approximate norms of 
functioning (e.g., Silvers on post-polio individuals pressured in 
rehab to use crutches rather than a wheelchair, or Wolbring on 
the pressure to use prosthetics rather than thalidomide-altered 
limbs), they have not typically argued that choices by disabled 
individuals to receive medical treatments to mitigate some of 
the negative consequences of their impairments are in any way 
less than fully autonomous due to internalized oppression.4 
That is, few scholars have claimed that seeking treatment to 
meet the species-typical norm of functioning is questionable 
because of internalized oppressive norms, though this may 
well be true. Partly this absence is due, I think, to a hesitation to 
undercut the autonomy of already oppressed people, by calling 
into question the authenticity of what they say they desire (even 
if the socially imposed reasons for their desires are really the 
intended target of moral criticism). Similar issues arose in the 
women’s rights movement’s calls for consciousness-raising.5 
But surely oppressed individuals can be empowered through 
critical engagement with their expressed values, at least when it 
is done sensitively and carefully.6 I also think the lack of attention 
to internalized oppression stems from the difficulty of discerning 
the difference between one’s own identity, forged in conditions 
of oppression, and the parts of one’s moral psychology that 
may be distorted by the same oppression (more on that to 
come in part 2).
My point for the moment, however, is that when mainstream 
negative attitudes about disability (i.e., that it is pitiable, that it 
is primarily a problem of an individual’s body, that it suggests 
global incompetence or at least distinct “otherness”) determine 
a disabled person’s attitudes about what she desires, as well 
as about her own worth and competence as an individual, we 
should pay attention to the likelihood of internalized oppression. 
When individuals have difficulty recognizing their own value, 
or when they desire a medical intervention because they 
think without it they can never be accepted by others, we 
have good reason to think their ability to make autonomous 
choices and act autonomously is constrained.7 In teaching 
courses in disability studies, I’ve found that a significant 
number of disabled students seemingly “find” themselves after 
learning about this new framework for disability. They may 
have submitted to diagnostic adventures, multiple therapies, 
and much rehabilitation in their lives, and thought they were 
doing so relatively autonomously, but when they discover 
the sociopolitical understanding of disability, they often feel 
newly empowered, and may reassess the authenticity or the 
autonomous nature of those former desires.
None of this necessitates a view that staunch disability 
studies activists and scholars could not autonomously seek 
medical treatment that might help them approximate species-
typical functioning. Rather, it highlights how tricky it can be to 
judge the difference between when oppression infiltrates our 
thinking, and when it merely recognizably alters our thinking8; 
when it diminishes our autonomy, and when it merely shapes 
our autonomous choices (sometimes by way of resistance, 
sometimes by way of chosen assimilation).
So it seems to me that the pressures on disabled people 
to normalize in respect to functioning share many troubling 
features with the pressures on women to meet sexist norms of 
appearance. We can call the first form of oppression ableism, 
as it harms those who fail to meet able-bodied/species-typical 
forms of functioning. Ableism in respect to functioning, then, 
is akin to sexism in respect to beauty norms. But what are we 
to say about the pressures on disabled people to meet certain 
appearance norms? Is a species-typical appearance norm as 
morally troubling as a species-typical functioning norm?
The group of individuals who do not meet appearance 
norms intersects with but does not wholly conform to the group 
of people with visible functional impairments.9 A person with 
prosthetic legs may have some functional impairments but 
greatly exceed appearance norms (e.g., athlete-turned-model 
Aimee Mullins). A person without any functional limitations 
may nonetheless fail to meet appearance norms (e.g., an 
individual with a large facial “wine stain”).10 It’s not clear what 
we would call the particular form of oppression related to 
failing to appear “normal.” Appearancism? Looksism? Putting 
questions of terminology on hold, though, we can see that 
individuals who fail to meet appearance norms may well face 
diminished autonomy in seeking to use medical interventions 
to try to achieve a normal appearance, given their perceived 
lack of options (be stared at, stay home, or get medical help to 
look normal)11 and the possibility that they have internalized 
the norms that denigrate their appearance, coming to see 
themselves as pitiable or lacking worth because of that 
appearance.12 Furthermore, we might think that the kind of 
oppression imposed by an excessive focus on appearance 
would encompass the kinds of ableism related to disability 
oppression, given that many functional impairments also 
leave individuals outside species typicality in respect to 
appearance.13
Internalized oppression and autonomous choice in 
accordance with mainstream values
Of course, not all norms or values that are internalized are 
pernicious or oppressive. And even oppressive norms that 
invariably shape one’s identity and desires may do so without 
necessarily undermining or diminishing one’s autonomy. 
How are we to tell the difference between someone who has 
internalized oppressive norms of ableism and seeks surgery to 
more closely approximate those norms in a way that suggests 
a diminishment of autonomy, and someone who has not 
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internalized the norms, but instead accepts that they exist, 
regrets it, perhaps even fights against them in some respects, but 
still autonomously seeks surgery to meet them as a calculated 
means of improving her social standing? It seems to me that our 
moral assessment of these two situations ought to be different 
(though in both cases we will regret the harmful norms of 
appearance). Resistance to the oppressive norms may be taken 
as a clear sign of independence from them, but surely we need 
not require complete resistance for autonomy.
Two points are worth considering here: recognizing 
oppression in the world (acknowledging its existence in 
respect to one’s group) is part of gaining autonomy, and being 
open to the idea that one’s own desires may be the result 
of internalized oppression seems important as well. So, for 
instance, a person who cannot see or refuses to acknowledge 
the ways in which a group she belongs to gets exploited, 
marginalized, or systematically denied power14 seems a likely 
victim of internalized oppression. Oppression operates in 
an insidious manner: both agents of oppression and many 
subjects of oppression may rationalize, naturalize, and attempt 
to justify the negative consequences of the oppression (e.g., 
“due to their impairments, disabled people are necessarily 
unable to perform in many jobs, and so are better off staying 
out of the workforce” or “mothers are less able to handle the 
stress and time commitments of work outside the home, and 
so ought to devote their time to their children”). Learning to 
see alternatives, to recognize that what appears natural or 
normal may be artificially imposed, is thus part of recognizing 
oppression and separating oneself from it. Of course, even 
as one sees oppression in the world, one might still believe it 
is a problem for others, not for oneself. “I know that women 
are held to unreasonable standards of beauty, but my own 
particular case was different—my body was outside the 
bounds of what can be accepted” is a close approximation 
of what many women cosmetic surgery recipients claim.15 
Thus, acknowledging the existence of oppression is far from 
sufficient for enhancing autonomy; one must also at least be 
open to the possibility that one’s own desires are the result of 
internalized oppression. It’s decidedly more difficult to specify 
what such openness consists in. Perhaps all that can be said is 
that the individual must be open to dialogue on the matter; she 
must have a willingness/capacity to answer to others about her 
choices, to defend them.16
Given those constraints, let’s consider two disabled people 
with similar conditions who seek an appearance-normalizing 
therapy (let’s say they each have scoliosis and each seeks 
surgery to straighten her spine, primarily for aesthetic reasons). 
One such person may claim that she does it because it’s the 
only way she can be relatively normal and feel good about 
herself; she may despise her scoliosis and feel that it ruins her 
opportunities for a reasonable life. She may report that she 
chooses the surgery because it’s the only alternative to a life 
in which she is afraid to be seen in public. When asked about 
whether or not the appearance norm she’s trying to meet might 
be somewhat unfairly imposed on her, she may adamantly 
deny the possibility, believing instead that it’s just what anyone 
would want. These features suggest a problem of internalized 
oppression. Another individual with the identical condition 
might also seek such a surgery. But she might note that it’s 
unfortunate that appearance matters so much in respect to 
doing well in this world, and agree that her need to undergo 
surgery in order to gain certain conveniences that follow from 
meeting appearance norms (no stares, fewer probing questions 
from strangers, greater ease in getting and keeping a job) is 
troubling. Furthermore, she may acknowledge that it’s possible 
that part of her desire for the surgery is really about meeting a 
norm that is difficult to resist, but still claim that she wants the 
surgery because she has to choose her fights, and she thinks 
it will be easier to combat ableist oppression generally if other 
people don’t find it so difficult to accept her appearance.17
So where does this leave us? I’ve tried to show that norms 
of species-typical appearance, like norms of species-typical 
functioning and norms of feminine beauty, are troubling in 
that they can undermine an individual’s sense of herself as 
a valuable agent, and through limiting available alternatives 
and/or leading to internalized oppression, can result in a 
diminishment of autonomy.
Two very quick final points are in order. One might object 
to my view by noting that while this may be true of a certain 
variety of appearance abnormalities, surely at the very edges 
of the “normal curve” we can understand that failure to meet 
appearance norms is clearly a problem of the body, and not 
at all about oppression. Here I think about the young Afghani 
woman who appeared on a recent cover of Time magazine, her 
nose cut off by relatives threatened by her willingness to run 
away from an abusive husband. That she is oppressed seems 
clear, but the oppression is not primarily about appearances. 
As she moves forward in life, should we really be concerned 
if she decides to seek surgery to create a new nose, because 
of a worry about troubling appearance norms? No doubt even 
more extreme cases could be found. I don’t think there’s an 
easy way to answer that objection. For anyone experienced 
in friendship with a person whose appearance is far from the 
norm, it seems appropriate to argue that oppression is still a 
key part of the problem, though perhaps action to address the 
individual body is more understandable or even justifiable, 
given the other difficulties to be faced by such an individual. 
But again, recognition and regret about the reality of those 
difficulties would have to be part of the explanation.18
Finally, while I have here focused on questions about 
whether or not pressures to normalize appearances are 
oppressive, and whether actions to seek appearance-
normalizing interventions are morally troubling in their 
capacity to constrain autonomy, I do think there’s an important 
further question about the consequences of receiving such 
interventions even when they are autonomously sought. That 
is, if enough individuals take action to meet a suspect norm 
of appearance, their actions will have a combined effect that 
exacerbates the strength of the questionable norm and the 
pressure put on others to meet it.19
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Comments on Talks by Silvers, Goering, and 
Brand, APA December 2010
Bonnie Steinbock
SUNY-Albany
Anita Silvers addresses two questions: What are medicine’s 
capabilities to bring about beauty? And, should medicine do 
this?  
She begins by distinguishing beauty from attractiveness 
and normality. Under the category of attractiveness, we may 
put cosmetic surgery, or “merely” cosmetic surgery: surgery 
that is not needed to restore normal functioning, but to improve 
one’s appearance. However, as Silvers points out, a middle-
aged divorced woman may be at a disadvantage in the job 
market if she looks old. Plastic surgery in this instance has 
a functional purpose, and insofar as it enables older women 
to combat the injustices to which they are subjected, justice-
based moral or political prohibitions of this use of medicine 
are unwarranted. 
Should physicians acquiesce to this sort of ageism? Are they 
even complicit in ageism if they do cosmetic surgery? Silvers 
does not directly address this question, but she does say that 
victims of social injustice should not have to bear the brunt of 
fighting it. I take this to mean that women who think they need 
plastic surgery to compete on the job market should not be 
made to feel bad about having it. And why should they—even 
if the reason is not to compete on the job market, but just to 
feel better about oneself?
Here I would like to distinguish between a personal issue 
and a social issue. The personal issue is the individual’s use 
of medicine and surgery for merely cosmetic purposes. Sara 
Goering says that this raises the hackles of many feminists, 
partly because they question how autonomous the choice of 
plastic surgery is. Clearly many women are pressured to go 
under the knife, as in her example of someone faced with losing 
her broadcasting job unless she has a face lift. The pressure 
is particularly acute for actresses, although it is not limited to 
women: witness Al Pacino who is barely recognizable.
I think it is a shame when so many actresses (and some 
actors) feel the need to look exactly alike. Ingrid Bergman did 
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not look like Joan Crawford who did not look like Myrna Loy. 
These days it’s hard to tell Clare Danes from Gwyneth Paltrow 
and either one from Kate Hudson. But I don’t see this as a 
moral issue. Some women do not need plastic surgery to get 
or keep jobs. They just want to look better. Quite honestly, I 
don’t see why that is anyone else’s business. I’m glad we’re a 
long way from my graduate school days when the wearing of 
lipstick was a political statement, not to mention shaving your 
legs or arms.
There is a serious social issue, however, and that has 
to do with the increasing popularity of plastic surgery as a 
specialization. According to an article in the New York Times 
in 2008, dermatology and plastic surgery are among the most 
competitive fields for residencies. It’s not a mystery why. The 
hours are better and the pay is way better. As one dermatologist 
put it, “It is an unfortunate circumstance that you can spend an 
hour with a patient treating them for diabetes and hypertension 
and make $100, or you can do Botox and make $2,000 in the 
same time.” Such discrepancies are dissuading some top 
students in American medical schools from going into family 
practice—and that is a serious social problem that needs to 
be addressed.
Regarding face transplants and surgery on children 
with facial anomalies, Silvers bases the acceptability of such 
interventions on the likelihood of “meaningfully improving 
social and/or biological functionality,” while recognizing that 
drastic interventions are risky, and may leave the patient worse 
off. In fact, not only are such interventions a justifiable use of 
medical expertise, but insofar as they enable individuals to 
participate fully in society, justice may require that they are paid 
for. Face transplants not only enable patients who need them to 
eat, breathe, and speak better, but they also reduce the number 
of encounters in which people turn away, and that, too, Silvers 
suggests, has a significant value.
By contrast, Goering suggests that there may be internalized 
oppression at work in the desire of people with facial anomalies 
to look normal. She writes, “When individuals…desire a 
medical intervention because they think without it they can 
never be accepted by others, we have good reason to think their 
ability to make autonomous choices and act autonomously is 
constrained.” Presumably, she finds the appeal to benefit and 
risk to be less than totally helpful, since the question is, Are 
people with facial anomalies benefited by surgery (assuming 
it’s successful) if it is chosen because other people turn away? 
Goering acknowledges the difficulty of determining whether 
someone who chooses surgery does so autonomously, in 
recognition of social realities and in order to improve her own 
situation, or does so out of internalized oppression.
The only way to find out, it seems, is for people to engage 
in dialogue about what they want and why they want it. The 
value of that is that sometimes they may come to realize that 
they don’t really want what they thought they wanted, or that 
they aren’t willing to undergo the cost and pain and risk of 
surgical alterations just to meet someone else’s conception of 
attractiveness or normality.
What about beauty? If beauty is distinct from attractiveness, 
what is it? Silvers doesn’t provide an analysis, although she 
says that it can’t be banal or bland. She relates the notion of 
beauty to art, and points out that sometimes artists get us to 
see the world differently. If we can appreciate a Picasso Cubist 
portrait as beautiful, we may also be able to perceive a condition 
characterized as a deformity as beautiful. (Here, I must say 
that it does not take much to view the photo Anita provides as 
attractive and engaging, and certainly not repellent.)
What are the normative implications? Silvers suggests 
that physicians have at least a mild moral obligation to view 
biological anomalies aesthetically, which means, I take it, as 
beautiful, and she says that this is a requirement of inclusive 
justice. However, this seems to conflict with her view that facial 
surgery to make children with disfigurements more attractive 
may be justified, depending on the benefit-risk ratio, and 
even required by considerations of social justice. So, should 
the physicians perform facial surgery to make people more 
conventionally attractive? Or should they try to see the beauty 
in biological anomalies, and counsel against surgery? Does the 
resolution of this question lie in what the individual person, 
free from internalized oppression, really wants, as suggested 
by Professor Goering? Perhaps she could say something about 
how she thinks adults might approach this question if they are 
choosing for not-yet-autonomous children, since often facial 
surgery is easier if done on young children (or even perhaps 
fetuses) since there is less risk of scarring.
Peg Brand takes up the challenge of viewing disability 
aesthetically. She is not primarily interested in the normative 
implications in terms of corrective surgery, but rather explores 
the social implications of art that portrays what is known as 
disability pride. The two subjects are connected, however, 
because they both reject the “medical model” of disability as 
something lacking, something to be fixed.
Here, things get very complicated. On the one hand, you 
have Ann Millett-Gallant, who argues that photographs of 
people with disabilities can be empowering and liberating, 
as they reject the view that their disability is something to 
hide or overcome. On the other hand, you have David Hevey, 
who argues that photography “enfreaks” disabled people. 
Brand suggests that both are possible results, which raises the 
question: How do you distinguish between representations 
that gawk at disability, which is voyeuristic and offensive, and 
genuine aesthetic appreciation of disability? Brand suggests that 
the key is the attitude of the model, that is, whether he or she 
feels empowered, proud, and beautiful as opposed to exploited 
and cheapened. She writes, “Beauty trumps offensiveness. Pride 
wins.” But she goes on to note that not everyone will agree, and 
Brand herself suggests that there are limits to justifications based 
on the model’s attitude. For example, Sally Mann took nude 
photos of her children, which some see as beautiful and others 
as pornography. Brand asks, “Is it enough for Mann’s daughter 
to report, later in life, that ‘we enjoyed being photographed. It 
gave us a sense of beauty?’” Not for Cynthia Freeland, who likens 
Mann’s photos of her children to little girl beauty pageants. Both 
hyper-sexualize and objectify children, which is wrong even if 
they enjoyed it at the time. Freeland comments, “Sally Mann 
is like any other stage mom (or dad) using a child as means 
to an end.”
Of course, the notion of using someone as a means (more 
accurately, mere means) to an end is notoriously difficult to 
flesh out. Onora O’Neill characterizes it as engaging someone 
in a plan to which they could not in principle consent—which 
works well for explaining the wrong of deception and coercion, 
but is unhelpful in this context. If we see taking nude pictures 
of children as hyper-sexualizing them, we are likely to think 
that they are being exploited and therefore treated as mere 
means. If we think that there’s nothing necessarily sexual about 
the nude bodies of children, we probably won’t. In any event, 
children, who cannot give autonomous consent, are probably 
the wrong model for thinking about “enfreakment.” The real 
question is whether the attitudes of autonomous adults toward 
the portrayal of their disability settle the question of exploitation. 
This question is not limited to the portrayal of disability in art. It 
comes up in discussions of surrogate motherhood (or contract 
pregnancy, if you prefer) and prostitution. In all of these cases, 
it seems to me, the mere consent of the agent is not sufficient 
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to overcome a charge of exploitation, since even autonomous 
agents can be wrong about their situation, for reasons such 
as false consciousness, lack of awareness, or social pressure. 
Indeed, even consent that is based on thoughtful reflection, 
based on the facts, and free of undue pressure would probably 
not be enough. In addition, others in the social milieu need to 
respect the person and whatever it is she is doing. Given the 
way prostitutes are viewed in most societies, it’s hard not to 
think of them as being objectified and exploited, but it’s not 
impossible to imagine a society in which being a sex worker 
is viewed as comparable to being a massage therapist, and in 
which both professions and the people who occupy them are 
respected. In such a society, a woman (or man) who chose 
to be a sex worker, and took pride in her work would have a 
good case for saying that she wasn’t being objectified in any 
objectionable sense, or exploited, or wronged.
However, it might be objected that just because society has 
out-dated, moralistic attitudes toward sex, it doesn’t follow that 
someone who autonomously chooses prostitution is necessarily 
being exploited. Perhaps social attitudes will change only if 
some brave souls make choices that run contrary to social 
values. This is often the function of art, so perhaps photos of 
disabled people will change the way society sees them and their 
disabilities. To the extent that such a change enables people 
with disabilities to live happier, more fulfilling lives, this would 
seem to be a good thing.
Brand ends with a photo which portrays an amputated 
limb. (I think. Brand refers to performing amputation, but it 
seems the leg has already been amputated and the photo shows 
her having removed her prosthesis.) Does the photograph 
embody agency, pride, and beauty, or something darker and 
unpleasant? If a photo of an amputation is beautiful, does that 
suggest we’re on a slippery slope, to validating or normalizing 
Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID), in which people want to 
have one or more of their limbs or hands amputated, believing 




Reprinted with permission from The Providence Journal, 
September 2, 2010, B6.
Irene has shining golden hair,
And fame and glory without end,
And greater wealth than even she
Could ever find a way to spend.
But Beth cannot afford to buy
What goes beyond her basic needs.
She must make do with what she has
And squeeze each penny till it bleeds.
Which woman hates her empty days?
Whose sadness makes her hard and mean?
Who yearns and yearns to change her life?
I’m sorry, but...it’s not Irene.





The nature and ethical implications of human suffering should 
be critical considerations to both moral philosophy in general 
and biomedical ethics in particular. Except perhaps for certain 
religious views about the redemptive, and therefore potentially 
positive, aspects of suffering, this phenomenon is usually 
considered an experience to be avoided whenever possible. 
A core value of medicine has been the relief of suffering 
associated with illness. Articulations of this value in the literature 
of the health professions reveal no effort to parse the nuances 
of the term suffering or engage in any sort of ethical analysis 
of circumstances in which the relief of suffering would be 
problematic. In both a figurative and literal sense, the physician 
and medical ethicist Eric Cassell has “written the book” on 
suffering from the clinical perspective, beginning with his 
seminal 1982 article in the New England Journal of Medicine,1 
and continuing with the first (1991) and second (2004) edition 
of his book of the same title, The Nature of Suffering and the 
Goals of Medicine.2
Essential to Cassell’s conceptual analysis of suffering is 
the nature of persons, for he insists that “bodies do not suffer; 
persons suffer.” Consequently, physicians cannot effectively 
respond to suffering if they do not engage with the person (the 
patient) who suffers. Cassell offers a topology of the person in 
the fully formed sense that would not necessarily encompass 
neonates or the profoundly demented. The essential attributes 
of persons from Cassell’s perspective include the following: 
personality and character, a past consisting of many life 
experiences, a family (however fragmented or dysfunctional), 
a cultural background, social roles, political status, behavioral 
patterns, a body, a secret life, a perceived future, and, finally, a 
transcendent dimension.3
Suffering, from Cassell’s perspective, occurs when an 
impending destruction of the person is perceived; it continues 
until the threat of disintegration has passed or until the integrity 
of the person can be restored in some other manner. Consistent 
with this concept of suffering, it can be defined as the state 
of severe distress associated with events that threaten the 
intactness of the person. It follows from this, he maintains, 
that while suffering may often coincide with the experience 
of pain or other physiological symptoms, such symptoms do 
not always engender suffering nor may suffering be reduced 
to pathophysiology. Cassell openly and pointedly challenges 
earlier inclinations by the medical profession to accept mind/
body dualism. Dualistic notions are pernicious because under 
such a construct suffering is either subjective and not within 
the scope of the physician’s responsibility, or it is reduced to 
bodily pain, which on his view would be factually erroneous 
and ethically unacceptable.
One cannot extensively review the literature of the health 
professions without realizing how influential, pervasively cited, 
and seemingly authoritative Cassell’s work on suffering has 
become. The operative word here is “seemingly” because 
recent work in the field of palliative medicine strongly suggests 
that mind/body dualism persists. Moreover, while citing Cassell’s 
work on suffering approvingly, the thrust of this recent work 
is radically inconsistent with his conception of suffering and 
his antagonism to dualism. The focus of this paper will be 
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an elucidation of this phenomenon and an exploration of the 
ethical implications of dualistic thinking within the domain of 
palliative medicine.
Recent Policies and Position Statements on Palliative 
Sedation
In 2001 the American College of Physicians-American Society 
of Internal Medicine’s (ACP-ASIM) Ethics and Human Rights 
Committee published a position paper expressing its opposition 
to physician-assisted suicide in general and as authorized under 
the Oregon Death With Dignity Act. An analysis of the arguments 
set forth therein is beyond the scope of this paper. However, 
what is of critical concern here is the ACP-ASIM discussion 
of suffering in the context of terminal illness. Consider the 
following language:
When patients continue to suffer from physical 
symptoms or psychiatric syndromes despite the best 
efforts at palliation, physicians should vigorously 
pursue the alleviation of these syndromes, even at 
the risk of unintentionally hastening death. But when 
the patient’s suffering is interpersonal, existential, 
or spiritual, the tasks of the physician are to remain 
present to “suffer with” the patient in compassion, and 
to enlist the support of clergy, social workers, family, 
and friends in healing the aspects of suffering that are 
beyond the legitimate scope of medical care.4
I shall return to further consider this language and its implications 
shortly. But first let us fast forward the calendar to 2008 and a 
report published by the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 
(CEJA) of the American Medical Association (AMA) that was 
formally adopted as the official policy of that organization. Its 
title is “Sedation to Unconsciousness in End-of-Life Care.” After 
citing earlier AMA opinions that the obligation of a physician 
includes “providing effective palliative treatment even though it 
may foreseeably hasten death,” the report moves to the primary 
focus of palliative sedation and states the following:
Palliative sedation to unconsciousness is only 
appropriate for terminally ill patients as an intervention 
of last resort to reduce severe, refractory pain or 
other distressing clinical symptoms that have not 
been relieved by aggressive symptom-specific 
palliation. …Severe psychological distress may also 
warrant palliative sedation to unconsciousness when 
potentially treatable mental health conditions have 
been excluded.5
We now come to the critical distinction initially introduced in the 
ACP-ASIM position paper that finds its way into the AMA-CEJA 
report on palliative sedation, which reads as follows:
Purely existential suffering may be defined as the 
experience of agony and distress that results from 
living in an unbearable state of existence including, 
for example, death anxiety, isolation, and loss of 
control…the Council concurs with those who argue 
that existential suffering distinct from the previously 
listed symptoms is not an appropriate indication for 
treatment with sedation to unconsciousness because 
the causes of this type of suffering are better addressed 
by other interventions.6
The other interventions are not otherwise specified, but one 
might reasonably infer that those mentioned in the ACP-ASIM 
position, i.e., clergy, social workers, family and friends of the 
patient, are prime candidates.
Let us be perfectly clear about the underlying proposition 
inherent in these two official pronouncements by major medical 
organizations: persons confronting terminal illness are likely to 
experience two quite different types or categories of suffering 
as they approach death. One of them is “clinical” in nature, 
is a responsibility of the physician to address, and when it 
proves refractory to other palliative measures may warrant 
sedation to unconsciousness. Another type of suffering, labeled 
existential, spiritual, or interpersonal, is nonclinical in nature, 
is not necessarily the responsibility of the physician, and does 
not warrant sedation to unconsciousness even when it proves 
refractory to all other palliative measures.
Neither report makes any reference to Cassell’s conceptual 
analysis of suffering, nor does it offer one of its own to explain 
and justify the proposition that human suffering associated 
with terminal illness partakes of two distinct varieties which 
require quite different palliative interventions and make widely 
disparate demands upon the physician. Further review of the 
literature does reveal a highly relevant instance in which the 
germ of an argument in support of this distinction is offered. 
Interestingly, one of the co-authors of that publication was also 
a member and one of two lead authors of the ACP-ASIM report, 
Dr. Daniel Sulmasy. To that article and its theses I now turn.
A Dualistic Account of Terminal Suffering
In an article entitled “Proportionality, Terminal Suffering, and 
the Restorative Goals of Medicine,” Lynn Jansen and Daniel 
Sulmasy (hereinafter J-S) argue that two distinctly different 
types of suffering may afflict the terminally ill, each of which 
makes different professional demands upon the clinician.7 
Failure to recognize this dichotomy of suffering, they worry, 
may lead physicians to engage in unethical conduct in the care 
of the dying. The two distinct types of suffering they identify 
are strikingly similar to that described by the ACP-ASIM and 
the AMA-CEJA. J-S ascribe to them the terms “neurocognitive” 
and “agent-narrative” suffering. Neurocognitve suffering, 
which purportedly includes such “symptoms” as anxiety 
disorder, clinical depression, seizures, and bone pain, is 
described as “suffering that has a direct causal relationship 
to the patient’s underlying medical condition” and would be 
reasonably expected to induce suffering in most patients who 
experience them. Agent-narrative suffering, which purportedly 
includes such “symptoms” as fear, sadness, worthlessness, 
loss of independence, is described as “suffering that has an 
indirect causal relationship to the patient’s underlying medical 
condition” and arises because of a particular patient’s attitudes 
and beliefs about his or her situation.8
There are two propositions that are critical to the J-S position 
that palliative sedation is never an ethically acceptable option 
for agent-narrative suffering, even when severe and refractory. 
The first is their belief that even in the case of the imminently 
dying patient, there is always the potential for restoration or 
healing, if not of physical, then of psychosocial well-being. 
Interestingly, however, their focus on the legitimate medical goal 
of restoring psychosocial well-being is entirely upon the patient 
afflicted with agent-narrative suffering. Thus, like the AMA, if a 
psychiatric diagnosis can be placed upon the patient’s distress 
and it is refractory to other therapeutic or palliative measures, 
then sedation to unconsciousness is an acceptable palliative 
option of last resort. In other words, additional and probably 
futile efforts at restoring psychosocial well-being need not be 
undertaken. However, if no acceptable psychiatric diagnosis 
is made and the patient’s distress is labeled agent-narrative or 
existential suffering, then sedation to unconsciousness is never 
acceptable and the physician is admonished to redouble the 
efforts of spiritual and social counselors and families to relieve 
the patient’s distress and the physician urged to remain present 
to suffer with the patient in compassion.
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It is also important to note that J-S focus on the restorative 
goals of medicine, not the patient. They do at one point 
acknowledge the possibility that “Some terminally ill patients 
will reject all efforts to restore them to a state of psychosocial 
well-being….” Nevertheless, they insist that to accede to the 
request of a patient afflicted with agent-narrative suffering 
would be unacceptable. The reason, they suggest, is that it 
would violate “the principle of therapeutic responsiveness,” 
their second core proposition.
J-S offer no authority or reference for this principle and 
an Internet search failed to reveal any source for it other than 
their article, so we must assume it is original to them. They 
offer the principle as a limitation upon or further qualification 
of the proportionality principle that is a critical feature of the 
Doctrine of Double Effect. In that context, the benefits derived 
by performing the act in question must be proportionate to 
the harms that can be reasonably anticipated. In this context, 
J-S refer specifically to an article by Quill, Lo, and Brock which 
suggests that “The greater the patient’s suffering, the greater 
the risk the physician can take of potentially contributing to 
the patient’s death, so long as the patient understands and 
accepts the risk.”9 J-S critique this articulation of the principle 
for its failure to acknowledge the existence of distinct types or 
categories of suffering and the impact such distinctions would 
have on acceptable risks that may be taken to alleviate them. 
As an antidote, they propose a revised proportionality principle 
that incorporates their principle of therapeutic responsiveness 
and which reads as follows:
A physician’s therapeutic response to terminal 
suffering is justified, even if it imposes a high risk of 
hastening the patient’s death, if and only if (i) the 
measures implemented are directly proportionate to 
the intensity of the patient’s suffering; (ii) the measures 
implemented are appropriate for the type of suffering 
the patient is experiencing and, therefore, are properly 
responsive to the patient’s restorative interests; 
and (iii) the patient or the patient’s legal surrogate 
understands and accepts the risks associated with 
the measures.10
J-S argue that if it would be inappropriate, according to their 
analysis, to provide palliative sedation to a patient with severe 
and intractable agent-narrative suffering who does not have 
a terminal condition, then it would also be inappropriate for 
a patient who does because the imminence of death does 
not eliminate the patient’s restorative interests. Moreover, a 
terminal patient’s refusal to pursue those interests and plea for 
palliative sedation will not justify the physician’s abandonment 
of medicine’s restorative goals.
Critiquing Dualism in Palliative Medicine
First, we should be clear that most certainly there are some 
manifestations of suffering in the context of terminal illness 
whose aspects partake more of the physiological than the 
psychological or spiritual. This observation is entirely consistent 
with Cassell’s topological analysis of the person and the multiple 
dimensions in which persons live their lives and experience 
the world. It is quite another thing entirely to insist upon the 
existence and ethical significance of quite rigid and categorical 
distinctions concerning the nature of suffering engendered 
by terminal illness. The effort to fully and accurately grasp 
the nature of terminal suffering, which is essential to the 
responsible formulation of ethical principles to support the 
provision of palliative options of last resort, is in important ways 
analogous to the largely philosophical inquiry into the nature 
of persons or selves that has been re-energized lately by the 
rise of neuroethics.
Just as the majority of contemporary philosophers and 
cognitive neuroscientists reject dualism between mind and 
body or mind and brain, so too ought we to be wary of efforts 
to impose such dualistic views on the nature of suffering. 
The very suggestion that a person in a far advanced stage of 
a terminal illness may experience a type of suffering that has 
little or no connection to the underlying pathophysiology of 
the disease runs counter to all that we know about the basic 
inter-relationship between the physical, the mental, and the 
situational in the lives of persons. Philosopher Walter Glannon 
has written most cogently on this subject recently. In arguing 
against what he refers to as neuroreductionism, the proposition 
that who we are as persons is essentially a function of neurons 
and synapses of the brain and central nervous system, he 
takes the position that there is compelling evidence that we 
are “embodied and embedded minds.”11 By that he means 
that our mental states (and here of course I would include 
the experience of all forms of suffering) are “generated and 
sustained by the brain and its interaction with external and 
internal features of our bodies,” but also that the “content and 
felt quality of our mental states is shaped by how we are situated 
and act in the natural and social environment.”
If Glannon’s account is reasonably accurate, as I believe it 
is, then it is strongly supportive of Cassell’s stance with regard 
to suffering in the context of serious, and most particularly 
terminal illness. We can do no better than to consider precisely 
what Cassell has written on this issue.
It is evident that in thinking about suffering it is 
not possible to divide the problem into physical, 
psychological, and social aspects without losing our 
grasp of it. In fact, reflecting on suffering should make 
it possible to see that there is nothing about the body 
that is not also psychological and social, nothing social 
that is not physical and psychological, and nothing 
psychological that is not physical and social. We are 
of a piece. What happens to one part of us happens 
to the whole and what happens to the whole happens 
to every part.12
I would offer only one minor semantic qualification. Rather than 
being of a piece, we are as persons, or so it would seem from 
the perspectives of Glannon, Cassell, and others, a seamless 
whole. Suffering, particularly of the dying, is an experience of 
the whole person that is inescapably existential regardless of 
the elements of the typology that may appear to predominate 
at any given moment in the trajectory of illness.
In a very real sense the approach to suffering advocated 
by the ACP, AMA, and J-S reaches beyond mind-body dualism 
to a triadic system of body, brain, and mind. According to this 
system, bodily suffering, primarily in the form of pain, and brain 
associated suffering, such as delirium or clinical depression, can 
be palliated with the sedation to unconsciousness. However, 
suffering attributable to the mind or self, so-called existential 
suffering, may not be addressed in this fashion even when 
severe and otherwise intractable. This trifurcated structuring of 
persons is radically inconsistent with all that we know of how 
persons experience living, dying, and suffering.
J-S published another article on palliative sedation in a 
medical journal the same year (2002) as the one we have been 
considering, in which their distinction between clinical and 
nonclinical (existential) suffering was much less thoroughly 
presented.13 A subsequent letter to the editor of the journal 
critiqued their approach in the following terms: “To argue 
that physical pain can be teased out of the multidimensional 
suffering of terminal illness and then used as [the] sole basis for 
the application of appropriate palliative options, to the disregard 
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of the whole person, is archaic mind-body dualism.”14 In their 
response, J-S deny without argument or explanation that their 
distinction between physical and existential suffering rests 
on dualism of any form, archaic or otherwise. Moreover, they 
offer no further support for their ethical stance that palliative 
sedation is inappropriate for even severe, refractory suffering 
of an existential nature in the imminently dying other than their 
belief that there exists a strong consensus view that it would 
never be appropriate for a nonterminal patient.15
Implications for Palliative Options of Last Resort
The policies I have noted above and the argumentation of J-S 
would have us believe the following. First, that human suffering 
is not only an entity that can be diagnosed by physicians, 
at least when it is associated with illness, but that there are 
two discrete types or categories of suffering which must be 
accurately diagnosed because they call for markedly different 
palliative measures. Second, that there is a category of terminal 
suffering that may be refractory to all other pharmacological 
or nonpharmacological measures which nevertheless may not 
be acceptably addressed by the two most notable palliative 
options of last resort, i.e., sedation to unconsciousness or a 
lethal prescription.
The ethical implications of this position are significant and 
disturbing. Beyond any reasonable doubt properly administered 
and maintained sedation to unconsciousness will remove 
the patient’s ability to experience suffering. To proscribe it for 
patients for whom other attempts at relief have failed comes 
perilously close to willfully inflicting it, in the words of David 
Morris. It is to consign them and their families to a death without 
dignity in contravention of a core principle of medical ethics. 
Even philosophers such as David Velleman, who have argued 
cogently from a deontological stance against a right to a lethal 
prescription, have acknowledged an exception. “When a person 
cannot sustain both life and dignity,” he writes, “his death may 
indeed be morally justified.” Thus when severe and intractable 
pain (or presumably suffering) has irretrievably undermined the 
patient’s dignity by becoming the entire focus of her life, then 
it can be said that the patient may reasonably choose death 
for the sake of dignity and not merely out of self-interest. This 
argument quite comfortably comports with Cassell’s definition 
of suffering as an actual or impending threat to the integrity of 
the person. When that threat cannot be eliminated or integrity 
restored in some other manner, the suffering is intractable and 
palliative options of last resort clearly indicated.
Before closing I wish to also point out the strong note, 
not just of paternalism, but of therapeutic belligerence in 
the J-S stance on the ethical response to intractable agent-
narrative suffering. Some of these patients may not wish to be 
subjected to the type of interventions often recommended for 
suffering that has been labeled “existential” or “spiritual.” This 
is particularly true when they are provided, as they usually are, 
by social workers, pastoral counselors, or clinical psychologists. 
Although J-S deny that they are dismissive of agent-narrative 
suffering as being real and engendering distress as severe as 
neuro-cognitive suffering, the fact remains that if a patient’s 
agent-narrative suffering is truly refractory, their approach leaves 
the patient to suffer until death, whereas those afflicted with 
neuro-cognitive suffering may achieve release with palliative 
sedation.
Even organizations whose policies and guidelines do 
not preclude palliative sedation for “existential suffering” 
often caution that it is much more difficult for the clinician to 
definitively determine that it is intractable.16 One means of doing 
so would be for the patient to submit to multiple psychosocial 
or spiritual interventions and yet find adequate relief from 
none. Patients who choose to exercise their right to decline 
such measures may be denied palliative sedation because their 
suffering has not been clearly shown to be intractable.
Conclusion
An adequate understanding of the nature of suffering is essential 
to professionals whose foundational principles include its relief. 
The recently developed policies and guidelines discussed 
herein strongly suggest that the consensus that had seemingly 
coalesced around Eric Cassell’s conceptual analysis of suffering 
was illusory. Moreover, the recent formulations appear to be 
grounded on dualistic notions that medicine was thought finally 
to have abandoned. The consequence is that patients with 
advanced terminal illness are in peril of being “diagnosed” with 
a “nonclinical” variety of suffering for which otherwise effective 
relief, i.e., palliative sedation, is precluded, thereby leaving them 
to endure their suffering unto death. 
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Habilitation into Healthy Agency and 
Theorizing about Imperfect Justice
Leslie Francis
University of Utah
To borrow a phrase from Lawrence Becker’s description of 
Amartya Sen’s work, how “gently normative” can a theory of 
justice be? More specifically, how much of a theory of the good, 
or a theory about a theory of the good, must a theory of justice 
presuppose? Can such a theory simply be a neutral framework, 
within which diverse entities with different conceptions of their 
good, may flourish? Or, must the theory begin with assumptions 
about the nature of the relevant entities, their good, or both? 
Is the answer to these questions different depending upon 
whether one is engaged in ideal theory, or in theorizing of some 
variety for circumstances recognized to be less than fully just?
In Habilitation, Health, and Agency, Becker develops the 
idea of “habilitation into healthy agency” as a meta-theory that 
aims to prescind disputes among various substantive theories of 
justice. In this enterprise, Becker hopes to avoid the normativity 
of, for example, the World Health Organization’s famously 
protean definition of “health”: “Health is a state of complete 
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the 
absence of disease or infirmity.” Instead, Becker aims to develop 
a conception of healthy agency to unify both negative aspects 
of human life (disease, disability) and positive (flourishing) 
sides of the ledger, drawing out basic elements of well-being in 
addition to health in a narrower medical sense. In other words, 
a descriptive account of healthy agency, and habilitative factors 
that foster it, can replace much of the contentiousness about 
the nature of the good life. Such an account can point to what 
theories of justice have in common, rather than the accounts 
of the good life that drive them apart. As Becker fully realizes, 
however, teasing out the descriptive from the normative in this 
area is not a simple task.
In this discussion, I hope to do three things with Becker’s 
rich and prescient discussion. First, I will sketch what I believe 
to be particularly important aspects of the move from “health” 
as a basic indexing characteristic for justice, to the move to 
“habilitation into healthy agency,” and then “habilitation into 
robustly healthy agency,” as such a good. This move, in my 
judgment, casts doubt on Becker’s claim to be doing meta-
theory about theories of justice, rather than theorizing directly 
about justice. So my second task will be to sketch briefly how 
I believe that the account of “habilitation into robustly healthy 
agency” is more normative than acknowledged. This will enable 
me to accomplish my third goal: illustrating why “habilitation 
into healthy agency” is a particularly useful rubric for pursuing 
justice under circumstances of grave injustice. Given our world, 
this is a very important accomplishment indeed.
Habilitation into Robustly Healthy Agency
Becker defends “habilitation into healthy agency” as a metric 
and as an index good for theories of justice to employ. Although 
this account begins with a definition of “health,” the definition 
is not a limited one, but rather more of a signpost. And for 
good reason.
Here is the definition of “health,” as Becker gives it in the 
manuscript: “The health of an individual human being is a set 
of functionally significant traits and/or states defined on a range 
running from non-survivable forms of disease, deficit, disorder, 
impairment, injury, or distress (ill health) to states or traits 
of physical or psychological strength, resistance, resilience, 
momentum, energy and activity (good health) that have 
reciprocal causal connections to ill health.” Health in this sense 
has both a negative side—illness—and a positive side: traits that 
reduce the risk of falling back onto the negative side.
On this view, judgments about whether any particular 
trait—say, guinea worm infection—contributes to health or 
detracts from it are empirical claims. We can observe the natural 
history of this infection and determine the likelihood of death 
from it as well as its impact on physical energy, ability to resist 
other infectious disease, and so on. Traits that might be core to at 
least some normative accounts of well-being—say, developing 
the capacity for practical reason—are (at least to some extent) 
observable contributors to the ability of a creature to avoid 
falling back onto the negative side of the ledger. One needs, 
after all, a certain understanding of the life cycle of the worm 
and the nature of water pollution in order to avoid contributing 
to its continuation. (People acquire the infection by drinking 
water contaminated by a tiny flea. The worm matures in the 
body, ultimately erupting through the skin. To soothe pain from 
the eruption, people bathe in water also used for drinking, thus 
releasing the worm to another cycle.)
Several other features of this definition, and the role it plays 
in habilitation into healthy agency, are noteworthy as well. 
First, health in this sense is not a static feature of human life, 
to be observed in any particular time slice. It is dynamic; traits 
that detract from or contribute to health are always changing. 
Any assessment of the health status of a being must take this 
dynamism into account. The absence of guinea worm infection 
at a particular moment in the life of an infant in the Sudan, for 
example, does not mean that the infant is healthy with respect 
to guinea worm disease. It may only mean that the infant has not 
yet gained the mobility to bathe in nearby infested waters.
Second, health in this sense is not merely a matter of 
the individual’s physical characteristics. It is a matter of the 
environment as well. An environment in which the individual 
cannot drink water without the likelihood of contracting guinea 
worm disease, and in which people do not know how to 
extract the worms without contributing to the ongoing cycle 
of infestation, is not an environment in which people have the 
trait of health with respect to the disease. In such environments, 
people who are temporarily free of the infestation are not free 
of the risk that they will acquire it, and so not healthy in this 
sense.
Third, an important aspect of maintaining health in 
this sense is the creature’s own agency. To maintain health, 
resistance, resilience, and regenerative factors must be 
complemented by generative factors: energy, momentum, 
and self-initiation. To continue with the guinea worm example, 
individual decisions and actions, such as whether to drink 
polluted water, contribute to the ongoing cycle of this disease. 
Other actions contribute, too: ranging from local resistance to 
pollution, to largely successful eradication efforts by the United 
Nations, to the war in the southern Sudan that has undermined 
these efforts in that region.
These additional factors—the dynamic, environmental, and 
agental aspects of health—are core to why Becker’s is a theory 
not just about health, but about habilitation into healthy agency. 
Habilitation is about the creation of the “objective necessities for 
human survival, physical and psychological development.” As 
such, it is ongoing—as Becker says, into. And it is environmental 
and agental; these necessities are a matter of the world, 
individuals, and the interactions among them: “Habilitation is 
about what we provide for others and about what we provide for 
ourselves.” So it must involve agency, agency that is sufficiently 
healthy to be both regenerative and generative.
But what of the adverb that Becker adds in the final 
version of his longer account: habilitation into robustly healthy 
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agency? What does it add, and what does the addition tell us 
about the view? I start with the difference between health and 
robust health, as Becker develops it. One can be healthy if 
one has traits that are stable in certain kinds of environments, 
but not in others. So, one might be a healthy diabetic, if one’s 
diabetes is well controlled, one has ready access to needed 
medical supplies, and access as well to means to prevent or 
manage any co-morbid conditions. In such circumstances, 
however, the judgment of “health” would be accompanied by 
an asterisk signifying that under less favorable conditions, the 
current good state would be expected to deteriorate. Robust 
health, in contrast, describes the situation in “which all the 
factors are stable and strong in a wide range of environments, 
with respect to a wide variety of ordinary health conditions, 
given merely competent habilitation of the sorts available in 
these environments.” And, robustly healthy agency is a critical 
component of this situation: “Without robustly healthy agency, 
one lacks abilities necessary for the self-monitored and self-
initiated activity often involved with sustaining other aspects 
of health at a robust level.” Note the qualification “often”: it 
reflects, I believe, a recognition of the turn from the descriptive 
to the normative.
Habilitation into Healthy Agency as Meta-theory?
Becker characterizes his enterprise as meta-theory. By this, 
he means the effort to create tools that can be used by “any 
plausible, normative account of distributive justice that 
philosophers now, or in the near future, are likely to advance.” 
This is indeed a daunting task. In this section, I want to suggest 
some concerns about achieving this goal for ideal theories of 
justice. But this is far from a negative analysis; these concerns 
also point to why the conception of habilitation into healthy 
agency that Becker develops may be critical to thinking about 
justice under circumstances of injustice.
If I understand Becker correctly, crucial to the claim to 
be doing meta-theory is avoiding assumptions that would 
conflict with the normative commitments of any plausible 
theory of distributive justice. Specifications of the particular 
form of the good life to be achieved by the just society—what 
Rawls and others have called comprehensive conceptions of 
the good—would violate this stricture. Assuming that we can 
separate out empirical claims from normative ones—and this 
is a significant assumption—one way to do meta-theory would 
be to identify a set of empirical claims that must be taken into 
account by any plausible theory of distributive justice and that 
can be used to measure that theory’s conclusions. If we assume 
that plausible theories of distributive justice will not tolerate 
death by early adulthood on a wide scale, for example, then 
all such theories should take into account empirical evidence 
about what factors are needed both to remedy circumstances 
that are likely to produce such deaths and to guard in a relatively 
stable way against the likely return of such circumstances. To 
be sure, no theory of justice can prevent earthquakes, but some 
theories when institutionalized, in contrast with others, reduce 
the likelihood of widespread death from such earthquakes or 
provide societies with the resilience to respond when they do 
occur.
Habilitation into healthy agency is meant as such a 
measuring tool and, to some extent, it is perfect for this job. 
Descriptively, we can identify factors that will result virtually 
immediately in death and specify a variety of preventive or 
ameliorative means to avoid them (although at the edges we 
might need to think about the relevance of interventions in 
these vital functions that can stave off mortality for at least a 
time).  Starvation exemplifies; minimal daily rations ameliorate. 
Similarly, we can identify factors that will make it difficult to 
sustain vital functions over time: desertification, pollution, and 
resulting crop loss exemplify. Identifying ameliorative factors 
is a more complicated matter, however, particularly if there 
are choices among institutions: property rights, international 
trade, emissions controls, and more. How a society is doing 
on these measures, as a matter of bare survival, will be part of 
a metric of any theory of justice that is committed to avoiding 
widespread early death in that society.
Things get much harder, however, when we move beyond 
survival. Another use of habilitation into healthy agency is to 
distinguish between “the region of health that is relevant to 
basic justice and the region beyond…” In other words, the 
concept is supposed to be able to help us to set out the range 
of what any theory of justice must address. Here, Becker relies 
heavily on the idea that some aspects of good health—in his 
words, “call them physical and psychological strengths”—are 
integrally necessary to the prevention of ill health, again in his 
words, “the presence of functionally significant physical or 
psychological disease, deficit, disorder, injury, or distress in a 
given range of environments.” If serious ill health in this sense 
is part of basic justice, then these needed factors of good health 
will be so as well.
But at this point, I fear the theory becomes normatively 
inflected. Consider, first, whether agency is an individual matter. 
Becker says that many of the coping abilities required for 
healthy agency must be self-supplied, or they do not “develop 
beyond rudimentary, fragile impulses.” If this is an empirical 
claim, questions of verification remain. On the other hand, it 
may be a definitional claim: agency is not healthy unless it 
is self supplied, in part at least. Or a metaphysical claim: an 
entity does not count as an agent unless it has the capacity for 
self-supplied motivation. Or a normative claim: that activities 
are more valuable, or that agents are more worthy, if they are 
self-supplied. The challenge I would put is this: Why should 
it be agency, something about being self-propelling, which 
matters as a way of generating health? Is agency simply more 
reliable, as an empirical matter, or is it more desirable from the 
perspective of a life well lived?
As I see it, the difficulty here is the move from health, 
to healthy agency, and beyond to robustly healthy agency. 
Individual motivation and freedom may be more reliable in 
a wide range of environments, but they may not be in others. 
On the other hand, they surely are part of, again in Becker’s 
words, “a high level of robustly healthy agency and the budding 
eudaimonistic virtues embedded in it.” There is a move here, 
from survival to freedom. It is a move I applaud, but see as 
deeply rooted in comprehensive conceptions of the good that 
value freedom.
Healthy Agency and Circumstances of Injustice
At the same time, there is much that seems exactly right about 
a focus on habilitation into healthy agency under circumstances 
of grave injustice. And there is much for us to keep thinking 
about in this territory.
First, consider the use of healthy agency as a metric. In 
circumstances of extreme poverty, making progress on survival, 
and then increasing its security, is arguably a unitary measure. 
More complex comparative judgments are unnecessary. 
Without this progress, nothing else is possible.
Then, consider the use of healthy agency as an index good. 
An alternative index good might be resources or wealth. Here, 
Becker would seem to be on firm ground in the empirical 
claim that health takes precedence over resources or wealth. 
How the latter might be used is unstable; stories of corruption 
are legion. But if health is improved, people are more likely to 
have the capacity to generate resources or wealth; they will 
have the energy to go to school, or to work, which they might 
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not otherwise have. There is something of this even in more 
affluent societies. The judgment seems reasonable that if 
someone is injured and loses access to wealth (e.g., a job), a 
more successful strategy may be to restore the agency which 
can be used to restore the health, than to restore the wealth. 
Compare this empirical observation to the clearly normative 
point Becker makes in passing, that we are more willing to use 
common resources to restore the health of someone who was 
at fault for his injury, than to restore the individual’s wealth.
Moreover, considering healthy agency as an index good 
for the scope of justice reminds us of the problems involved 
in extrapolating from ideal to non-ideal contexts. Rawls, for 
example, contended that as a matter of ideal justice, first 
principle liberties should be taken as lexically prior to economic 
arrangements. However, there are well-known examples of 
how liberties of speech and conscience have undermined 
health, and not just as a matter of sparking immediate violence. 
The Nigerian imams who inveighed against polio vaccine were 
responsible for the spread of an outbreak which eventually 
extended to some twenty-six countries. If we understand this, 
we can see why it would be wrong to prioritize the freedom of 
conscience and expression of the Nigerian imams who spread 
fears of vaccination against polio—and thus spread polio itself. 
Yet on the Rawlsian view, as a matter of ideal justice freedom 
of conscience and speech—the freedoms invoked by the 
imams—must be set aside for lexically prioritized protection, as 
long as they are compatible with maximizing similar freedoms 
for others.
Much has been accomplished and will be accomplished in 
this and other work of Lawrence Becker’s, even if meta-theory 
may not have been.
How Medicine Saved the Life of Ethics
Stephen Toulmin*
University of Chicago
Reprinted with permission from Perspectives in Biology and 
Medicine 25, no. 4 (1982): 736-50.
During the first 60 years or so of the twentieth century, two 
things characterized the discussion of ethical issues in the 
United States, and to some extent other English-speaking 
countries also. On the one hand, the theoretical analyses of 
moral philosophers concentrated on questions of so-called 
metaethics. Most professional philosophers assumed that their 
proper business was not to take sides on substantive ethical 
questions but rather to consider in a more formal way what 
kinds of issues and judgments are properly classified as moral 
in the first place. On the other hand, in less academic circles, 
ethical debates repeatedly ran into stale-mate. A hard-line group 
of dogmatists, who appealed either to a code of universal rules 
or to the authority of a religious system or teacher, confronted 
a rival group of relativists and subjectivists, who found in 
the anthropological and psychological diversity of human 
attitudes evidence to justify a corresponding diversity in moral 
convictions and feelings.1
For those who sought some “rational” way of settling 
ethical disagreements, there developed a period of frustration 
and perplexity.2 Faced with the spectacle of rival camps taking 
up sharply opposed ethical positions (e.g., toward premarital 
sex or anti-Semitism), they turned in vain to the philosophers 
for guidance. Hoping for intelligent and perceptive comments 
on the actual substance of such issues, they were offered only 
analytical classifications, which sought to locate the realm of 
moral issues, not to decide them.
Two novel factors contributed to this standoff by making 
the issue of subjectivity an active and urgent one. For a start, 
developments in psychology—not least, the public impact 
of the new psychoanalytic movement—focused attention 
on the role of feelings in our experience and so reinforced 
the suspicion that moral opinions have to do more with our 
emotional reactions to that experience than with our actions in 
it [3]. So, those opinions came to appear less matters of reason 
than matters of taste, falling under the old tag, quot honnnes, 
tot sententiae. This view of ethics was strengthened by the 
arguments of the ethnographers and anthropologists, who 
emphasized the differences to be found between the practices 
and attitudes of different peoples rather than the common core 
of problems, institutions, and patterns of life that they share. To 
cap it all, the anthropologist Edward Westermarck took over 
Albert Einstein’s term “relativity” from physics and discussed 
the moral implications of anthropology under the title of Ethical 
Relativity [4].
Between them, the new twentieth-century behavioral and 
social sciences were widely regarded as supporting subjectivist 
and relativist positions in ethics; this in turn provoked a 
counterinsistence on the universal and unconditional character 
of moral principles; and so a battle was joined which could 
have no satisfactory outcome. For, in case of substantive 
disagreement, the absolutists had no further reasons to offer for 
their positions: all they could do was shout more insistently or 
bring up heavier theological guns. In return, the relativists could 
only turn away and shrug their shoulders. The final answers to 
ethical problems thus came, on one side, from unquestioned 
principles and authoritative commands; on the other, from 
variable and diverse wishes, feelings, or attitudes; and no agreed 
procedure for settling disagreements by reasonable argument 
was acceptable to both sides.
How did the fresh attention that philosophers began 
paying to the ethics of medicine, beginning around 1960, 
move the ethical debate beyond this standoff? It did so in four 
different ways. In place of the earlier concern with attitudes, 
feelings, and wishes, it substituted a new preoccupation with 
situations, needs, and interests; it required writers on applied 
ethics to go beyond the discussion of general principles and 
rules to a more scrupulous analysis of the particular kinds of 
“cases” in which they find their application; it redirected that 
analysis to the professional enterprises within which so many 
human tasks and duties typically arise; and, finally, it pointed 
philosophers back to the ideas of “equity,” “reasonableness,” 
and “human relationships,” which played central roles in the 
Ethics of Aristotle but subsequently dropped out of sight [5, 
esp. 5.10.1136b30-1137b32]. Here, these four points may be 
considered in turn.
The Objectivity of Interests
The topics that preoccupied psychologists and anthropologists 
alike during the first half of the twentieth century were foreign 
to the concerns of physicians, and they tended to distract 
attention from those shared features of human nature which 
define the physiological aspects of human medicine and so 
help to determine the associated ethical demands. To begin 
with, the novel anthropological discoveries that exerted most 
charm over the general public were those customs, or modes 
of behavior, which appeared odd, unexpected, or even bizarre, 
as compared with the normal patterns of life familiar in modern 
industrial societies. The distinctive features of unfamiliar 
cultures (rain dances, witch doctors, initiation ceremonies, 
taboos, and the like) captured the imaginations of general 
readers far more powerfully than those which manifested the 
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common heritage of humanity: the universal need to eat and 
drink, the shared interest in tending wounds and injuries, and 
so on. Theoretically, likewise, field anthropologists focused 
primarily on the differences among cultures, leaving the 
universals of social structure to the sister science of sociology. 
In their eyes, the essential thing was to explain the modes of 
life and activity typical of any culture in terms appropriate to 
that particular culture, not in terms brought in from outside with 
the anthropologist’s own cultural baggage.
As a result, the whole field of medicine was something of a 
stumbling block to anthropology. If one studied the procedures 
employed in handling cases of tuberculosis among, say, pygmies 
in the Kalahari Desert, it might well turn out that they did not 
recognize this affliction as being, by Western standards, a true 
“disease.” In that case it might—anthropologically speaking—be 
inappropriate to comment on their procedures in medical terms 
at all. On the contrary, witch doctoring must be appraised in 
“ethnomedical” terms, by standards adapted to the conception 
of witch doctoring current inside the culture in question.
For those who were concerned with the internal 
systematicity of a given culture, this might be an acceptable 
method. In adopting it, however, one was obliged to set aside 
some of the basic presuppositions of the modern Western (and 
international) profession of medicine: notably, the assumption 
that human beings in all cultures share, in most respects, 
common bodily frames and physiological functions. While 
the epidemiology of, say, heart disease may in some respects 
be significantly affected by such cultural factors as diet, the 
evils of heart disease speak no particular language, and to that 
extent the efficacy of different procedures for dealing with that 
condition can be appraised in transcultural terms.
So, the cross-cultural study of epidemiology and kindred 
subjects—what may be called “comparative medicine”—has 
to be distinguished sharply from the intracultural study of 
“ethnomedicine.” The latter is concerned with the attitudes, 
customs, and feelings current within exotic cultures in the 
face of those afflictions that we ourselves know to be diseases, 
whether or not the people concerned so perceive them. The 
former, by contrast, is concerned with the treatments available 
in different countries or cultures, regardless of the special 
attitudes, customs, or feelings that may cluster around those 
conditions locally, in one place or another. Fieldworkers from 
the World Health Organization, for instance, are concerned with 
comparative medicine and are not deterred from investigating 
the links between, say, eye disease and polluted water 
supplies just because members of the affected community 
do not recognize these links. The central subject matter of 
medicine thus comprises those objective, universal conditions, 
afflictions, and needs that can affect human beings in every 
culture, as contrasted with those relative, subjective conditions, 
complaints, and wishes that are topics for anthropological study 
in any given culture.
Now we are in a position to see how needlessly moral 
philosophers thrust themselves into the arms of the “ethical 
relativists” when they adopted anthropology as their example and 
foundation. An ethics built around cultural differences quickly 
became an ethics of local attitudes. The same fate overtook 
those philosophers who sought their example and foundation 
in the new ideas of early twentieth-century psychology. For they 
were quickly led into seeing ethical disagreements between one 
human being and another as rooted in their personal responses 
to and feelings about the topics in debate; as a result, questions 
about the soundness of rival moral views were submerged by 
questions about their origins.
Contrast, for instance, the statement, “She regards 
premarital sex as wrong because her own straitlaced upbringing 
left her jealous of, and censorious toward, today’s less 
puritanical young”—which offers us a psychological account 
of the causes by which the ethical view in question was 
supposedly generated—with the statement, “She regards it as 
wrong because of the unhappiness which the current wave 
of teenage pregnancies is creating for mothers and offspring 
alike”—which states the interests with which the view is 
concerned and the reasons by which it is supported. Modeling 
ethics on psychology thus once again diverts attention from 
genuine interests and focuses them instead on labile, personal 
feelings.
The new attention to applied ethics (particularly medical 
ethics) has done much to dispel the miasma of subjectivity 
that was cast around ethics as a result of its association with 
anthropology and psychology. At least within broad limits, an 
ethics of “needs” and “interests” is objective and generalizable 
in a way that an ethics of “wishes” and “attitudes” cannot be. 
Stated crudely, the question of whether one person’s actions 
put another person’s health at risk is normally a question of 
ascertainable fact, to which there is a straightforward “yes” or 
“no” answer, not a question of fashion, custom, or taste, about 
which (as the saying goes) “there is no arguing.” This being 
so, the objections to that person’s actions can be presented 
and discussed in “objective” terms. So, proper attention to 
the example of medicine has helped to pave the way for a 
reintroduction of “objective” standards of good and harm and 
for a return to methods of practical reasoning about moral 
issues that are not available to either the dogmatists or the 
relativists.
The Importance of Cases
One writer who was already contributing to the renewed 
discussion of applied ethics as early as the 1950s was Joseph 
Fletcher of the University of Virginia, who has recently been 
the object of harsh criticism from more dogmatic thinkers 
for introducing the phrase “situation ethics.”3 To judge from 
his critics’ tone, you might think that he was the spokesman 
for laxity and amorality, whereas he belongs, in fact, to a very 
respectable line of Protestant (specifically, Episcopalian) moral 
theologians. A main influence on him in his youth was Bishop 
Kenneth Kirk, whose book on Conscience and Its Problems, 
published in 1927 [9], was one of the few systematic works 
by an early twentieth-century Protestant theologian to employ 
the “case method” more usually associated with the Catholic 
casuists. Via Kirk, Fletcher thus became an inheritor of the older 
Evangelical tradition of Frederick Dennison Maurice.4
Like his predecessors in the consideration of “cases of 
conscience,” Kirk was less concerned to discuss conduct in 
terms of abstract rules and principles than he was to address 
in concrete detail the moral quandaries in which real people 
actually find themselves. Like his distinguished predecessors—
from Aristotle and Hermagoras to Boethius, Aquinas, and the 
seventeenth-century Jesuits—he understood very well the 
force of the old maxim, “circumstances alter cases.” As that 
maxim indicates, we can understand fully what is at stake in 
any human situation and how it creates moral problems for the 
agents involved in it only if we know the precise circumstances 
“both of the agent and of the act”: if we lack that knowledge, 
we are in no position to say anything of substance about the 
situation, and all our appeals to general rules and principles will 
be mere hot air. So, in retrospect, Joseph Fletcher’s introduction 
of the phrase “situation ethics” can be viewed as one further 
chapter in a history of “the ethics of cases,” as contrasted with 
“the ethics of rules and principles”; this is another area in which 
the ethics of medicine has recently given philosophers some 
useful pointers for the analysis of moral issues.
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Let me here mention one of these, which comes out of 
my own personal experience. From 1975 to 1978 I worked as a 
consultant and staff member with the National Commission for 
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research, based in Washington, D.C.; I was struck by the extent 
to which the commissioners were able to reach agreement 
in making recommendations about ethical issues of great 
complexity and delicacy.5 If the earlier theorists had been right, 
and ethical considerations really depended on variable cultural 
attitudes or labile personal feelings, one would have expected 
11 people of such different backgrounds as the members of the 
commission to be far more divided over such moral questions 
than they ever proved to be in actual fact. Even on such thorny 
subjects as research involving prisoners, mental patients, and 
human fetuses, it did not take the commissioners long to identify 
the crucial issues that they needed to address, and, after patient 
analysis of these issues, any residual differences of opinion 
were rarely more than marginal, with different commissioners 
inclined to be somewhat more conservative, or somewhat 
more liberal, in their recommendations. Never, as I recall, did 
their deliberations end in deadlock, with supporters of rival 
principles locking horns and refusing to budge. The problems 
that had to be argued through at length arose, not on the level 
of the principles themselves, but at the point of applying them: 
when difficult moral balances had to be struck between, for 
example, the general claims of medical discovery and its future 
beneficiaries and the present welfare or autonomy of individual 
research subjects.
How was the commission’s consensus possible? It rested 
precisely on this last feature of their agenda: namely, its close 
concentration on specific types of problematic cases. Faced 
with “hard cases,” they inquired what particular conflicts of 
claim or interest were exemplified in them, and they usually 
ended by balancing off those claims in very similar ways. Only 
when the individual members of the commission went on to 
explain their own particular “reasons” for supporting the general 
consensus did they begin to go seriously different ways. For, 
then, commissioners from different backgrounds and faiths 
‘justified” their votes by appealing to general views and abstract 
principles which differed far more deeply than their opinions 
about particular substantive questions. Instead of “deducing” 
their opinions about particular cases from general principles that 
could lend strength and conviction to those specific opinions, 
they showed a far greater certitude about particular cases than 
they ever achieved about general matters.
This outcome of the commission’s work should not come 
as any great surprise to physicians who have reflected deeply 
about the nature of clinical judgment in medicine. In traditional 
case morality, as in medical practice, the first indispensable 
step is to assemble a rich enough “case history.” Until that 
has been done, the wise physician will suspend judgment. If 
he is too quick to let theoretical considerations influence his 
clinical analysis, they may prejudice the collection of a full 
and accurate case record and so distract him from what later 
turn out to have been crucial clues. Nor would this outcome 
have been any surprise to Aristotle, either. Ethics and clinical 
medicine are both prime examples of the concrete fields of 
thought and reasoning in which (as he insisted) the theoretical 
rigor of geometrical argument is unattainable: fields in which 
we should above all strive to be reasonable rather than insisting 
on a kind of exactness that “the nature of the case” does not 
allow [5, 1.3.1094b12- 27].
This same understanding of the differences between 
practical and theoretical reasoning was taken over by Aquinas, 
who built it into his own account of “natural law” and “case 
morality,” and so it became part of the established teaching of 
Catholic moral theologians. As such, it was in harmony with the 
pastoral practices of the confessional [12, D.3, Q.5, A.2, Solutio]. 
Thus, Aquinas’s own version of the fundamental maxim was 
framed as an injunction to the confessor—“like a prudent 
physician”—to take into account peccatoris circumstantiae 
atque peccati, that is, “the circumstances both of the sinner 
and of the sin.” Later, however, the alleged readiness of 
confessors to soften their judgments in the light of irrelevant 
“circumstances” exposed them to criticism. In particular, 
the seventeenth-century French Jesuits were attacked by 
their Jansenist coreligionists on the ground that they “made 
allowances” in favor of rich and high-born penitents that they 
denied to those who were less well favored. And, when the 
Jansenist Arnauld was brought before an ecclesiastical court on 
a charge of heterodoxy, his friend Pascal launched a vigorous 
counterattack on the Jesuit casuists of his time by publishing 
the series of anonymous Lettres provinciales which from that 
time on gave “casuistry” its unsavory reputation.6
Looking back, however, we may wonder how far this 
reputation was really justified. No doubt, a venal priest could 
corrupt the confessional by showing undue favor to penitents 
of wealth or power: for example, by fabricating specious 
“extenuating circumstances” to excuse conduct that was 
basically inexcusable. But we have no reliable way of knowing 
how often this really happened, and the mere possibility of such 
corruption does nothing to change the original point—namely, 
that practical decisions in ethics can never be made by appeal 
to “self-evident principles” alone and rest rather on a clinical 
appreciation of the significant details characteristic of particular 
cases. No doubt, we are free to use the word “casuistry”—like 
the parallel words “wizardry” and “sophistry”—to refer to “the 
dishonest use of the casuist’s (or the clinician’s) arts,”7 but that 
does no more to discredit the honest use of “case morality” than 
it does the honest use of case methods in clinical medicine.
By taking one step further, indeed, we may view the 
problems of clinical medicine and the problems of applied 
ethics as two varieties of a common species. Defined in 
purely general terms, such ethical categories as “cruelty” and 
“kindness,” “laziness” and “conscientiousness,” have a certain 
abstract, truistical quality: before they can acquire any specific 
relevance, we have to identify some actual person, or piece of 
conduct, as “kind” or “cruel,” “conscientious” or “lazy,” and 
there is often disagreement even about that preliminary step. 
Similarly, in medicine: if described in general terms alone, 
diseases too are “abstract entities,” and they acquire a practical 
relevance only for those who have learned the diagnostic art of 
identifying real-life cases as being cases of one disease rather 
than another.
In its form (if not entirely in its point) the art of practical 
judgment in ethics thus resembles the art of clinical diagnosis 
and prescription. In both fields, theoretical generalities are 
helpful to us only up to a point, and their actual application to 
particular cases demands, also, a human capacity to recognize 
the slight but significant features that mark off, say, a “case” of 
minor muscular strain from a life-threatening disease or a “case” 
of decent reticence from one of cowardly silence. Once brought 
to the bedside, so to say, applied ethics and clinical medicine 
use just the same Aristotelean kinds of “practical reasoning,” 
and a correct choice of therapeutic procedure in medicine is 
the right treatment to pursue, not just as a matter of medical 
technique but for ethical reasons also.
“My Station and Its Duties”
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, F. H. Bradley of 
Oxford University expounded an ethical position that placed 
“duties” in the center of the philosophical picture, and the 
recent concern of moral philosophers with applied ethics 
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(most specifically, medical ethics) has given them a new 
insight into his arguments also. It was a mistake (Bradley 
argued) to discuss moral obligations purely in universalistic 
terms, as though nobody was subject to moral claims unless 
they applied to everybody—unless we could, according to the 
Kantian formula, “will them to become universal laws.” On the 
contrary, different people are subject to different moral claims, 
depending on where they “stand” toward the other people with 
whom they have to deal, for example, their families, colleagues, 
and fellow citizens [13].
For Bradley, that is to say, the central consideration in 
practical ethics was the agent’s standing, status, or station. 
He himself preferred to use the last of these three words (i.e., 
“station”), and this led his liberal contemporaries to undervalue 
his arguments. They suspected him of subscribing to the 
conservative sentiments of the old couplet, “God bless the Squire 
and his relations,/ And keep us in our proper stations”—that is, 
the stations to which “it has pleased [rather than shall please] 
God to call us.” Yet this was an unfortunate response since, as 
we now realize, Bradley was drawing attention to points of real 
importance. As the modern discussion of medical ethics has 
taught us, professional affiliations and concerns play a significant 
part in shaping a physician’s obligations and commitments, and 
this insight has stimulated detailed discussions both about 
professionalism in general and, more specifically, about the 
relevance of “the physician/patient relationship” to the medical 
practitioner’s duties and obligations.8
Once embarked on, the subject of professionalism has 
proved to be rich and fruitful. It has led, for instance, to a 
renewed interest in Max Weber’s sociological analysis of 
vocation (Beruf) and bureaucracy, and this in turn has had 
implications of two kinds for the ethics of the professions. For, 
on the one hand, the manner in which professionals perceive 
their position as providers of services influences both their sense 
of calling and also the obligations which they acknowledge on 
that account. And, on the other hand, the professionalization of 
medicine, law, and similar activities has exposed practitioners 
to new conflicts of interest between, for example, the individual 
physician’s duties to a patient and his loyalty to the profession, as 
when his conduct is criticized as “unprofessional” for harming, 
not his clients, but rather his colleagues.
In recent years, as a result, moral philosophers have 
begun to look specifically and in greater detail at the situations 
within which ethical problems typically arise and to pay closer 
attention to the human relationships that are embodied in 
those situations. In ethics, as elsewhere, the tradition of radical 
individualism for too long encouraged people to overlook 
the “mediating structures” and “intermediate institutions” 
(family, profession, voluntary associations, etc.) which stand 
between the individual agent and the larger scale context of his 
actions. So, in political theory, the obligation of the individual 
toward the state was seen as the only problem worth focusing 
on; meanwhile, in moral theory, the differences of ’ status 
(or station) which in practice expose us to different sets of 
obligations (or duties) were ignored in favor of a theory of justice 
(or rights) that deliberately concealed these differences behind 
a “veil of ignorance.”9
On this alternative view, the only just—even, properly 
speaking, the only moral—obligations are those that apply to us 
all equally, regardless of our standing. By undertaking the tasks 
of a profession, an agent will no doubt accept certain special 
duties, but so it will be for us all. The obligation to perform those 
duties is “just” or “moral” only because it exemplifies more 
general and universalizable obligations of trust, which require 
us to do what we have undertaken to do. So, any exclusive 
emphasis on the universal aspects of morality can end by 
distracting attention from just those things which the student of 
applied ethics finds most absorbing—namely, the specific tasks 
and obligations that any profession lays on its practitioners.
Most recently, Alasdair Maclntyre has pursued these 
considerations further in his new book, After Virtue [l6]. 
MacIntyre argues that the public discussion of ethical issues 
has fallen into a kind of Babel, which largely springs from our 
losing any sense of the ways in which community creates 
obligations for us. One thing that can help restore that lost 
sense of community is the recognition that, at the present 
time, our professional commitments have taken on many of 
the roles that our communal commitments used to play. Even 
people who find moral philosophy generally unintelligible 
usually acknowledge and respect the specific ethical demands 
associated with their own professions or jobs, and this offers 
us some kind of a foundation on which to begin reconstructing 
our view of ethics. For it reminds us that we are in no position 
to fashion individual lives for ourselves, purely as individuals. 
Rather, we find ourselves born into communities in which the 
available ways of acting are largely laid out in advance: in which 
human activity takes on different Lebensformen, or “forms of 
life” (of which the professions are one special case), and our 
obligations are shaped by the requirements of those forms.
In this respect, the lives and obligations of professionals 
are no different from those of their lay brethren. Professional 
obligations arise out of the enterprises of the professions in 
just the same kinds of way that other general moral obligations 
arise out of our shared forms of life; if we are at odds about 
the theory of ethics, that is because we have misunderstood 
the basis which ethics has in our actual practice. Once again, 
in other words, it was medicine—as the first profession to 
which philosophers paid close attention during the new phase 
of “applied ethics” that opened during the 1960s—that set the 
example which was required in order to revive some important, 
and neglected, lines of argument within moral philosophy 
itself.
Equity and Intimacy
Two final themes have also attracted special attention as a 
result of the new interaction between medicine and philosophy. 
Both themes were presented in clear enough terms by Aristotle 
in the Nicomachean Ethics. But, as so often happens, the full 
force of Aristotle’s concepts and arguments was overlooked by 
subsequent generations of philosophers, who came to ethics 
with very different preoccupations. Aristotle’s own Greek terms 
for these notions are epieikeia and philia, which are commonly 
translated as “reasonableness” and “friendship,” but I shall 
argue here that they correspond more closely to the modern 
terms, “equity” and “persona] relationship” [5].
Modern readers sometimes have difficulty with the style 
of Aristotle’s Ethics and lose patience with the book, because 
they suspect the author of evading philosophical questions that 
they have their own reasons for regarding as central. Suppose, 
for instance, that we go to Aristotle’s text in the hope of finding 
some account of the things that mark off “right” from “wrong”: 
if we attempt to press this question, Aristotle will always slip 
out of our grasp. What makes one course of action better than 
another? We can answer that question, he replies, only if we 
first consider what kind of a person the agent is and what 
relationships he stands in toward the other people who are 
involved in his actions; he sets about explaining why the kinds 
of relationship, and the kinds of conduct, that arc possible as 
between “large-spirited human beings” who share the same 
social standing are simply not possible as between, say, master 
and servant, or parent and child [5].
The bond of philia between free and equal friends is 
of one kind, that between father and son of another kind, 
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that between master and slave of a third, and there is no 
common scale in which we can measure the corresponding 
kinds of conduct. By emphasizing this point, Aristotle draws 
attention to an important point about the manner in which 
“actions” are classified, even before we say anything ethical 
about them. Within two different relationships the very same 
deeds, or the very same words, may—from the ethical point 
of view—represent quite different acts or actions. Words that 
would be a perfectly proper command from an officer to an 
enlisted man, or a straightforward order from a master to a 
servant, might be a humiliation if uttered by a father to a son, 
or an insult if exchanged between friends. A judge may likewise 
have a positive duty to say, from the bench, things that he 
would never dream of saying in a situation where he was no 
longer acting ex officio, while a physician may have occasion, 
and even be obliged, to do things to a patient in the course of 
a medical consultation that he would never be permitted to do 
in any other context.
It is easy to let oneself be distracted by Aristotle’s use of 
“the master-slave relationship” to illustrate the differences 
between different kinds of philia. But the points that he 
wishes to emphasize have nothing to do with slavery as such, 
and they hold good equally well if applied instead to our old 
friend, “the physician-patient relationship.” For, surely, the very 
deed or utterance by Dr. A toward Mrs. B which would be a 
routine inquiry or examination within a strictly professional 
“physician-patient relationship”—for example, during a 
gynecological consultation—might he grounds for a claim of 
assault if performed outside that protected context. The philia 
(or relationship) between them will be quite different in the 
two situations, and, on this account, the “circumstances” do 
indeed “alter cases” in ways that are directly reflected in the 
demands of professional ethics.
With this as background, we can turn to Aristotle’s ideas 
about epieikeia (“reasonableness” or “equity”). As to this 
notion, Aristotle pioneered the general doctrine that principles 
never settle ethical issues by themselves: that is, that we can 
grasp the moral force of principles only by studying the ways in 
which they are applied to, and within, particular situations. The 
need for such a practical approach is most obvious, in judicial 
practice, in the exercise of “equitable jurisdiction,” where the 
courts are required to decide cases by appeal, not to specific, 
well-defined laws or statutes, but to general considerations of 
fairness, of “maxims of equity.” In these situations, the courts 
do not have the benefit of carefully drawn rules, which have 
been formulated with the specific aim that they should be 
precise and self-explanatory: rather, they are guided by rough 
proverbial mottoes—phrases about “clean hands” and the 
like. The questions at issue in such cases are, in other words, 
very broad questions—for example, about what would be just 
or reasonable as between two or more individuals when all 
the available facts about their respective situations have been 
taken into account [17-19]. Similar patterns of situations and 
arguments are, of course, to be found in everyday ethics also, 
and the Aristotelean idea of epieikeia is a direct intellectual 
ancestor of a central notion (still referred to as “epikeia”) in 
the Roman Catholic traditions of moral theology and pastoral 
care [11].
In ethics and law alike, the two ideas of philia (“friendship” 
or “relationship”) and epieikeia (or “equity”) are closely 
connected. The expectations that we place on people’s lines of 
conduct will differ markedly depending on who is affected and 
what relationships the parties stand in toward one another. Far 
from regarding it as “fair” or “just” to deal with everybody in a 
precisely equal fashion, as the “veil of ignorance” might suggest, 
we consider it perfectly equitable, or reasonable, to show some 
degree of partiality, or favor, in dealing with close friends and 
relatives whose special needs and concerns we understand. 
What father, for instance, does not have an eye to his children’s 
individual personalities and tastes? And, apart from downright 
“favoritism,” who would regard such differences of treatment as 
unjust? Nor, surely, can it be morally offensive to discriminate, 
within reason, between close friends and distant acquaintances, 
colleagues and business rivals, neighbors and strangers? We are 
who we are: we stand in the human relationships we do, and 
our specific moral duties and obligations can be discussed in 
practice only at the point at which these questions of personal 
standing and relationship have been recognized and taken into 
the account.
Conclusion
From the mid-nineteenth century on, then, British and 
American moral philosophers treated ethics as a field for 
general theoretical inquiries and paid little attention to issues 
of application or particular types of cases. The philosopher who 
did most to inaugurate this new phase was Henry Sidgwick, and, 
from an autobiographical note, we know that he was reacting 
against the work of his contemporary, William Whewell [20, 
21]. Whewell had written a textbook for use by undergraduates 
at Cambridge University that resembled in many respects a 
traditional manual of casuistics, containing separate sections 
on the ethics of promises or contracts, family and community, 
benevolence, and so on [22]. For his part, Sidgwick found 
Whewell’s discussion too messy: there must be some way 
of introducing into the subject the kinds of rigor, order, and 
certainty associated with, for example, mathematical reasoning. 
So, ignoring all of Aristotle’s cautions about the differences 
between the practical modes of reasoning appropriate to ethics 
and the formal modes appropriate to mathematics, he set out 
to expound the theoretical principles (or “methods”) of ethics 
in a systematic form.
By the early twentieth century, the new program for moral 
philosophy had been narrowed down still further, so initiating 
the era of “metaethics.” The philosopher’s task was no longer 
to organize our moral beliefs into comprehensive systems: that 
would have meant taking sides over substantive issues. Rather, 
it was his duty to stand back from the fray and hold the ring 
while partisans of different views argued out their differences in 
accordance with the general rules for the conduct of “rational 
debate,” or the expression of “moral attitudes,” as defined in 
metaethical terms. And this was still the general state of affairs 
in Anglo-American moral philosophy in the late 1950s and the 
early 1960s, when public attention began to turn to questions 
of medical ethics. By this time, the central concerns of the 
philosophers had become so abstract and general—above all, 
so definitional or analytical—that they had, in effect, lost all 
touch with the concrete and particular issues that arise in actual 
practice, whether in medicine or elsewhere.
Once this demand for intelligent discussion of the ethical 
problems of medical practice and research obliged them to 
pay fresh attention to applied ethics, however, philosophers 
found their subject “coming alive again” under their hands. 
But, now it was no longer a field for academic, theoretical, even 
mandarin investigation alone. Instead, it had to be debated 
in practical, concrete, even political terms, and before long 
moral philosophers (or, as they barbarously began to be called, 
“ethicists”)” found that they were as liable as the economists 
to be called on to write “op ed” pieces for the New York Times, 
or to testify before congressional committees.
Have philosophers wholly risen to this new occasion? Have 
they done enough to modify their previous methods of analysis 
to meet these new practical needs? About those questions there 
can still be several opinions. Certainly, it would be foolhardy to 
claim that the discussion of “bioethics” has reached a definitive 
— Philosophy and Medicine —
— 25 —
form, or to rule out the possibility that novel methods will earn 
a place in the field in the years ahead. At this very moment, 
indeed, the style of current discussion appears to be shifting 
away from attempts to relate problematic cases to general 
theories—whether those of Kant, Rawls, or the utilitarians—to 
a more direct analysis of the practical cases themselves, using 
methods more like those of traditional “case morality.” (See, 
e.g., the discussion in a recent issue of the Hastings Center 
Report of the moral issues that are liable to arise in cases of 
sex-change surgery [23, pp. 8-13].)
Whatever the future may bring, however, these 20 years of 
interaction with medicine, law, and the other professions have 
had spectacular and irreversible effects on the methods and 
content of philosophical ethics. By reintroducing into ethical 
debate the vexed topics raised by particular cases, they have 
obliged philosophers to address once again the Aristotelean 
problems of practical reasoning, which had been on the 
sidelines for too long. In this sense, we may indeed say that, 
during the last 20 years, medicine has “saved the life of ethics,” 
and that it has given hack to ethics a seriousness and human 
relevance which it had seemed—at least, in the writings of the 
interwar years—to have lost for good.
This paper is one outcome of a research project undertaken in 
collaboration with Dr. Albert R. Jonsen, of the University of California at 
San Francisco, with the support of a grant from the National Endowment 
for the Humanities, no. R0-0086-79-1466.
*Committee on Social Thought, Department of Philosophy and Divinity 
School, University of Chicago.
Endnotes
1. For a further exploration of the standoff, see [1].
2. It was, in fact, just this problem which presented itself to me 
when I wrote my doctoral dissertation [2].
3. Just how much of a pioneer Joseph Fletcher was in opening 
up the modern discussion of the ethics of medicine is clear 
from the early publication date (1954) of his first publications 
on this subject [6-8]
4. It was Albert Jonsen who drew my attention to the work of 
Kenneth Kirk and his great forerunner, the mid-nineteenth-
century Evangelical teacher, F. D. Maurice [101. For further 
discussion consult A. R. Jonsen [11].
5. The work of the national commission generated a whole 
series of government publications—mainly reports and 
recommendations on the ethical aspects of research involving 
research subjects from specially “vulnerable” groups having 
diminished autonomy, such as young children and prisoners. 
I have written a fuller discussion of the commission’s work 
for a forthcoming Hastings Center book on the “closure” of 
disputes about matters of technical policy. As a member of the 
commission, A. R. Jonsen was also struck by the casuistical 
character of its work, and this led to the research project of 
which this paper is one product.
6. The Lettres provinciales were published periodically, and 
anonymously, in 1656-57, but it did not take long for their 
authorship to be discovered, and they have remained perhaps 
the best-known documents on the subject of “case reasoning” 
in ethics. The intellectual relationship between the vigorous 
attack on the laxity of the Jesuits’ case morality contained in 
the Lettres and the larger program of seventeenth-century 
philosophy deserves closer study than it has yet received.
7. For the word “casuistry,” see the entry in the complete Oxford 
English Dictionary, which revealingly points out how many 
English nouns ending in “ry” (e.g., “Sophistry,” “wizardry,” 
and “Popery”) are dyslogistic. It seems to be no accident 
that the earliest use of the word “casuistry” cited in the OED 
dates only from 1725—i.e., after Pascal’s attack on the Jesuit 
casuists. This helps to explain, and confirm, the current 
derogatory tone of the word.
8. See Bledstein’s discussion [14, p. 107] of the nineteenth-
century confusion between codes of ethics and codes of 
etiquette within such professional societies as the American 
Medical Association.
9. I borrow this phrase a trifle unfairly from John Rawls [15], 
but I have argued at greater length in [1] that any unbalanced 
emphasis on “universality,” divorced from “equity” is a recipe 
for the ethics of relations between strangers and leaves 
untouched those important issues that arise between people 
who are linked by more complex relationships.
10. Once again, the Oxford English Dictionary has a point to make. 
It includes the word “ethicist” but leaves it without the dignity 
of a definition, beyond the bare etymology, “ethics + ist.”
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BOOK REVIEW
Why Some Things Should Not Be For Sale: 
The Moral Limits of Markets
Debra Satz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
Reviewed by Paulette Kidder
Seattle University
Is our society’s collective reluctance to legalize prostitution, 
establish an open market in human kidneys, or allow newborns 
to be sold to adoptive parents simply a set of irrational holdovers 
from a pre-capitalist era? Or are there good reasons to continue 
to keep some things out of the marketplace? Debra Satz’s 
excellent and cogently argued book offers a framework for 
deciding when and why some things should not be bought and 
sold. In laying out this framework, Satz provides guidance in a 
number of important areas of bioethics in which markets and 
their limits play a contested role.
Four “parameters” of markets serve as criteria for 
identifying undesirable markets: what Satz terms “vulnerability, 
weak agency, extremely harmful outcomes for individuals, and 
extremely harmful outcomes for society” (9, italics in original). 
Participants in a market may be vulnerable because they 
urgently need a particular good and the supply is inadequate, 
because they are “poor and destitute,” or because their need 
for the item is greater than that of other participants (98). Weak 
agency occurs, for example, when some market participants 
lack adequate information about the exchange. A market may 
cause extreme harm to individuals, or it may cause harm to 
society; for example, it may “undermine the social framework 
needed for people to interact as equals” or for them to 
participate as “co-deliberants” in a democratic process (95-96). 
Any market that registers poorly on one or more of these four 
parameters is considered “noxious” (98). For example, a market 
in which poorer countries allowed wealthy countries to dispose 
of toxic waste within their borders for a fee would be noxious 
because it would be characterized by undue vulnerability (the 
weaker bargaining position of poor countries), weak agency 
(lack of governmental representation of citizens’ interests in 
many developing countries), and extremely harmful outcomes 
to individuals (the effects of exposure to toxic waste) (109-110). 
Of Satz’s four parameters of a noxious market, the only one not 
directly implicated in this example is “harm to society,” though 
Satz indicates that there are indirect social harms involved in 
such a market.
Contract Pregnancy
Satz develops the implications of her theory using several 
contested examples, including chapter-long treatments 
of markets in women’s “reproductive labor” (Chapter 5), 
women’s “sexual labor” (Chapter 6), child labor (Chapter 7), 
voluntary slavery (Chapter 8), and the sale of human kidneys 
(Chapter 9). Her discussion of contract pregnancy in Chapter 
6 is illuminating both in the way it treats the issue itself and 
for the way it shows how Satz’s theory differs from previous 
treatments of the ethics of surrogacy and of the role of markets 
in general. In her critique of contract pregnancy, Satz endorses 
the “asymmetry thesis,” which holds that “markets in women’s 
reproductive labor…are more problematic than other currently 
accepted labor markets” (115). Satz’s central reason for finding 
markets in women’s reproductive labor to be noxious is that 
they cause extreme harm to society by reinforcing the unequal 
status of women (128). They do this, she argues, by giving other 
people control over the pregnant surrogate’s diet, activities, 
and sense of attachment to the fetus she carries (129), but 
unlike similar controls exercised over, e.g., soldiers, control 
exercised over pregnant women “reinforces a long history of 
gender-based inequality” (129). Further, contract pregnancy 
“reinforces negative stereotypes of women as ‘baby machines,’” 
and lastly, insofar as judicial decisions in contested cases have 
favored only those surrogate mothers who were also the genetic 
mothers of the children they carried, it fails to recognize that 
motherhood, like fatherhood, can arise from causes other than 
the contribution of DNA (131).
Satz holds that the existence of a noxious market calls for 
a societal or governmental response, which may take the form 
of regulation, of changing the background conditions in which 
the market operates, or of banning that market altogether (10). 
What, then, is the appropriate societal response to the noxious 
market in contract pregnancy? Because most of her objections 
to this market come back to the way it reinforces gender 
hierarchy, Satz says that “under very different background 
conditions [i.e., in a society in which there were overall 
gender equality], such contracts would be less objectionable” 
(131). But under current conditions of gender inequality, Satz 
recommends regulation of surrogacy contracts, i.e., making 
them unenforceable if the pregnant woman changes her mind, 
viewing gestational mothers as having a claim to parental 
rights, and disallowing “third-party brokerage” (132). Banning 
contract pregnancy completely, she argues, would only lead to 
an underground market in it.
Comparison to Classic and Contemporary Thinkers
Her discussion of contract pregnancy illustrates the way that 
Satz stakes out her own position in distinction from several 
others. In contrast to Marx, Satz recognizes that markets, 
including labor markets, can enhance freedom and choice 
(21), but she denies that they can do so without regulation by 
the state in order to enforce property rights, promote the flow 
of information, prevent monopolies, etc. (26ff). In recognizing 
the essential role of market regulations, Satz is critical of laissez-
faire economics. She also objects to economists’ claim to be 
able to study markets in an ethically neutral manner. Satz argues 
that “we must expand our evaluation of markets…to include 
the effects of such markets on the structure of our relationships 
with one another, on our democracy, and on human motivation” 
(35). In moving beyond economists’ narrow claims of moral 
neutrality, Satz consciously recovers the “neglected and rich” 
theories of Adam Smith and other early economists. Satz’s 
discussion of Smith in Chapter 2 makes a well-documented and 
illuminating case that Smith, usually portrayed as a champion 
of unfettered markets, in fact was deeply concerned about the 
effects of markets, particularly labor markets, on the character 
of individuals and societies (46). Because of these concerns, 
Smith “was tolerant of governmental regulation of wages on 
behalf of laborers” (43) and he supported public education, 
whose existence can be seen as a limitation on the free market 
in private education.
 Satz’s call for regulation of contract pregnancy and other 
noxious markets opposes, then, economists who might call for 
deregulation of such markets on the “morally neutral” grounds 
that deregulation would lead to greater efficiency. Of course, 
not all economic and political theorists claim moral neutrality 
on the subject of markets; some seek to reform markets in 
the name of egalitarianism. Satz distinguishes her own view 
from that of “general egalitarians” such as Ronald Dworkin, 
by questioning the premise that social inequalities can be 
best addressed by bringing about equality of resources (such 
as money that citizens could spend in light of their individual 
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preferences) (66). Satz argues that Dworkin fails to take into 
account that markets and other factors shape those preferences 
such that they are not simply given, nor can they necessarily 
be regarded as “authentic” (69). She calls for greater attention 
on the part of general egalitarians to shaping the social world, 
instead of focusing mainly on ensuring equality of individuals’ 
resources (71).
Satz is also critical of “specific egalitarianism,” which she 
understands to be the view that “certain scarce goods ‘should 
be distributed less unequally than the ability to pay for them’” 
(79). In the category of specific egalitarians, she places Michael 
Walzer, who sees markets in some goods, such as education, 
health care, and political equality, as “degrading” to the social 
meaning of those goods (80); Elizabeth Anderson, who argues 
that some goods should not be seen as commodities but rather 
as objects of “respect or reverence” (81); Michael Sandel, who 
claims “that we corrupt many moral and civic goods if they are 
bought for money”; and Margaret Jane Radin, who calls for 
regulation or blockage of exchanges of those goods that are 
“closely connected to personhood” (81). These thinkers all 
take the view that to place moral limits on markets can mean 
to regulate or ban the sale of particular items such as babies, 
organs, military service, or sexual services. Satz’s approach is 
much less focused on what is for sale than it is on the ways that 
any market can have its source in the compromised agency 
of some participants and on the harmful effects that may flow 
from it. Satz holds that any market can “in principle” become 
noxious, but that certain kinds of markets are more likely to 
become so, including those in “health care, education, labor, 
and political influence” (10).
Returning to the example of contract pregnancy, whereas 
Sandel criticizes contract pregnancy on the grounds that a 
parental tie to a child is not the kind of thing that should be 
sold,1 and Radin approves a ban on paid surrogacy (“for now”) 
in part because of the potential for a “domino effect” leading 
to a general view that babies and their characteristics are 
commodities (Radin 148),2 Satz’s critique of contract pregnancy 
rests mainly on the “externalities” (costs to third parties) of the 
exchange within a society characterized by gender hierarchy. In 
a society free of such hierarchies, contract pregnancy could be 
more acceptable in Satz’s view, but not, presumably, in Sandel’s 
or in Radin’s. (Radin considers the question of whether, in a 
hypothetical world where no one were desperate or subordinate 
to others, commodification of persons or items intrinsic to 
personhood in itself would no longer be objectionable, but she 
rejects this idea because she views commodification as a form 
of objectification, and objectification of persons as “one of the 
marks of subordination.”3)
Satz finds those approaches that focus on excluding 
certain kinds of things from markets (or regulating their sales) 
“interesting and illuminating” (81). But, she argues, “there 
are rival views of the meaning of many particular goods” and 
“there is only a tenuous connection in most cases between the 
meaning we give to a good and its distribution by a market” 
(81). As an example of the latter point, Satz describes the 
way a believer in religion can buy a Bible without seeing it as 
degrading to the book’s meaning, or the way a right to health 
care may be seen as compatible with a market in the provision 
of such care (82).
Satz’s theory, then, calls for greater moral limits on markets 
than do the theories of many economists, and it does so on the 
basis of reasons that could in principle be widely accepted in 
a society concerned to promote those cultural and political 
attitudes conducive to democratic participation. Focusing on 
qualities of markets rather than on the nature of goods to be 
sold allows Satz to argue in favor of limiting markets on moral 
grounds, while avoiding a debate over the contested meaning 
of such goods as well as a debate over whether that meaning 
is degraded when the item is bought and sold.
The Sale of Human Kidneys
Satz’s chapter on the sale of human kidneys further demonstrates 
the bioethical implications of her approach. Consistent with her 
theory, she asks not about the meaning of human organs in 
particular societies, but about whether organ markets are likely 
to be compromised by vulnerability or the other parameters 
important to her theory. Satz finds that in a legalized kidney 
market most of the sellers might be poor and desperate, hence 
vulnerable. Sellers might also have inadequate information 
about the long-term effects of losing a kidney, as often seems to 
be the case in India (196). A market in kidneys could reinforce 
existing inequalities between rich and poor (198). Further, such 
a market could cause harm to third parties who do not wish to 
sell their kidneys but who would be faced with a credit market 
in which kidneys were considered valuable collateral and in 
which those who did not want to put up a kidney as collateral 
would find it harder to obtain credit (200).
In light of these difficulties, should the ban on kidney-selling 
in developed countries be maintained? Satz notes the possibility 
that allowing kidney sales could increase the supply of kidneys 
and therefore save lives (though she recognizes that, as found 
in Richard Titmuss’s research into blood donation, the opposite 
result could occur) (192-195). As well, she notes that most or 
all of the problems she raised regarding kidney markets could 
be controlled by regulations rather than by maintaining the 
ban (205). Satz finds that some forms of a kidney market (e.g., 
a pure competitive market) are more likely than others (e.g., 
a competitive futures market with the organ sold upon death) 
to violate her four parameters (205). She leaves open, then, 
the door to an ethically acceptable market in kidneys in the 
future, should it take one of the forms that avoid the problems 
she has identified.
In addition to her discussions of contract pregnancy and 
kidney sales, Satz’s work is relevant to bioethics in that her 
discussion of markets in education sheds light on debates over 
the analogous market in health care. Satz draws the parallel 
between education and health care at several points (100, 102, 
210). Taking up insights from T.H. Marshall, Satz argues that 
“distributing primary and secondary education solely through 
a market system” is harmful to democratic societies because 
it fails to equip citizens with the capacities to “participate 
competently and meaningfully in democratic self-governance” 
(101). Markets in private education can coexist with public 
education, but they cannot substitute for it. An analogous 
argument could certainly be made for markets in health care.
Conclusion
Satz has taken on an important and far-reaching set of questions 
and has made a remarkably clear, consistent, and historically 
rooted case for a way to articulate and critique the reasons 
behind our typical resistance to the unlimited expansion of 
markets. For bioethics, Satz’s four parameters of noxious 
markets provide a very useful specification of Beauchamp’s 
and Childress’s four principles, in that she specifies the ways 
that markets may cause harm (or fail to promote sufficient 
benefit) both to individuals and to social values necessary to a 
democratic society. This point provides a nuanced expansion 
of the principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence. Satz’s 
concerns for weak agency and vulnerability suggest useful 
expansions of the principles of respect for autonomy and 
justice, respectively.
Satz’s work takes a middle path between proponents of the 
moral neutrality of markets and those who argue that certain 
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items have their meaning degraded if they are commodified. 
Satz’s willingness to speak out on behalf of non-quantifiable 
values such as the overcoming of servility, the promotion of 
persons’ ability to be co-deliberants in a democracy, and the 
structure of human relationships is highly admirable. But these 
non-quantifiable goods seem to me no less contestable (and no 
less worthwhile) than some of the “meanings” that Satz finds 
to be beyond the scope of discussion. When Satz concludes 
that her “endorsement” of Ronald Dworkin’s view that body 
parts should not be viewed as social resources (and therefore 
kidneys should not be marketed) is “a bit tentative” because 
of the need of dying people to obtain kidney transplants (201), 
that tentativeness on Satz’s part may give the reader pause. 
Satz’s tentativeness here can be seen as the courage to question 
received views or as a failure to see that there may be more 
wisdom reflected in those received views than is contained in 
the four parameters of Satz’s theory.
I am left, then, with some doubts as to whether Satz’s four 
parameters fully capture everything that (rightly, in my view) 
leads thinkers such as Anderson, Radin, and Sandel to want 
to place some things outside the market (or regulate the ways 
they can be sold) as opposed to limiting only those markets that 
infringe too heavily on one or more of the four parameters that 
Satz has identified. Satz mentions that “some goods do have 
a meaning that resists commodification—think of friendship, 
love, and Nobel prizes—[but] the overwhelming majority of 
goods do not” (84). It is not clear why these three examples 
“resist commodification” for Satz. Does she see markets in these 
items as rating poorly on one or more of the four parameters 
(would a market in these goods harm democratic participation 
or exploit the vulnerable?), or do they resist commodification 
for other reasons? And if there are other reasons related to the 
meaning of these goods (e.g., their relationship to ideas like 
“personhood” or “dignity”), might not those other reasons also 
justifiably be applied to other goods such as parental ties to their 
genetic offspring, even if to do so necessitates a discussion of 
disputed values?
In conclusion, this is an admirable, engaging, and 
sophisticated book that makes a major contribution to the 
debates about the ethics of market exchanges. For bioethicists, it 
brings illuminating new considerations and a depth of historical 
perspective to central questions in the field.
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